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Abstract
This article reflects on the protection of territorial integrity in the Ukrainian constitution,
especially on its provision of unamendability, against the backdrop of the 2014 Crimean
crisis. At the general level, we examine whether constitutional theory can offer answers
when confronted with the apparent inefficacy of a constitutional claim to eternity. More
specifically, we focus on what the Ukrainian case can teach us about the implications of
designating territorial integrity or indivisibility of a state as an eternal/unamendable
constitutional principle. Building on insights from the Crimean crisis, we argue that the
unamendable protection of territorial integrity is an especially ineffective type of eternity
clause because it is subject to both the internal threat of secession and the external risk of
forceful annexation. The preservative promise of unamendable territorial integrity is
severely curtailed by this double vulnerability, even when backed by a constitutional court
with far-reaching powers of judicial review. Territorial integrity as an eternal constitutional
principle then remains merely aspirational. Moreover, we argue that the act of entrenching
territorial protection as an unamendable principle is in clear tension with the idea of
popular sovereignty and with mechanisms for expressing popular will.
East-Central European constitutions play like songs of
the liturgy on a very old gramophone. You hear the
expected music performed in the service of
constitutionalism, but you hear it with a crackle in the
background. The performance is old-fashioned in order
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to receive the nullo obstat of the Council of Europe and
sometimes (when territorial integrity comes up) the
soprano's voice suffers from hysteria.
A. Introduction
Ukraine's 2014 crisis began as anti-governmental protests that led to the removal of
Ukraine's former president, Viktor Yanukovich in February 2014, after which pro-Russian
militias in Crimea took control of strategic facilities and of Crimea's administrative borders
with the rest of Ukraine. On 1 March 2014, the Russian State Duma approved a request by
President Vladimir Putin to engage Russian forces in Ukraine in order to protect Russian
lives. Later, Russian and pro-Russian forces gradually took over Ukrainian military sites and
the main official institutions in Crimea. On 6 March 2014, the Supreme Council of the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea adopted a resolution, "On the All-Crimean Referendum,"
on the basis of Articles 18(1)(7) and 26(2)(3) of the Crimean Constitution.3 This resolution
was meant to provide the legal basis for a referendum on independence, to be held on 16
March 2014, but was promptly contested by Ukrainian and international voices.4 On 11
March 2014, Crimea's parliament approved a resolution on the independence of Crimea
and "if a decision to become part of Russia [was] made at the referendum of the 16 March
2014." The resolution declared Crimea as an independent, sovereign state and requested
the Russian Federation to accept the Republic of Crimea as a new constituent entity of the
Russian Federation with a status of a republic.5
Andras Saj6, Reforming Prince Potemkin, 2 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 126, 126 (1993).
See Ben Smith & Daniel Harari, Ukraine Crimea and Russia, HOUSE or COMMONS LIBRARY 1-6 (Mar. 17, 2014),
http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/briefing-papers/RP14-16/ukraine-crimea-and-russia;
Ivanna Bilych, Alexander Gudko, Kateryna Kuntsevich, Matheus Sena, Malvika Seth & Olena Sharvan, The Crisis in
Ukraine: Its Legal Oimensions, RAZOM 34-35 (2014),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/razaminc/Tre Crisis InUkraine - ItsLegalDmensions.lpdf.
Artcle 18(1)(7) provides that the Autonomous Republic may "call and hold republican (local) referendums upon
matters coming under the terms of reference of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea." THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
AUTONOMOUS REPUBLICor CRIMEA Oct. 21, 1998, art. 18()(7). Crimean Constitution Article 26(2)(3) provides that the
Supreme Council may "pass a resolution upon holding a republican (local) referendum." Id. art. 26(2)(3).
4 See Anne Peters, Sense and Nonsense of Territorial Referendums in Ukraine, and Why the 16 March Referendum
in Crimea oes Not Justify Crimea's Alteration of Territorial Status under international Law, EJIL: TALK!, Apr. 16
2014, http://www.ejitalk.org/sense-and-nonsense-of-territorial-referendurms-in-ukraine-and-why-the-16-march-
referendum-1n-crimea-does-not-justify-crimeas-alteration-of territorial-status-under international-law/ (last
visited June 16, 2015).
See Resolution 'On the independence of Crimea,' RT (Mar. 17, 2014, 15:09), http://rt.com/news/crimea-
resolution-independence-ukraine-346/ (last visited June 16, 2015).
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The Ukrainian government did not recognize the referendum and declared it illegali On 14
March 2014, the Ukrainian Constitutional Court found the Crimean referendum to be
unconstitutional and ordered the Crimean authorities to immediately cease all
preparations for it. On 20 March 2014, the same Court declared the resolution of the
parliament of Crimea "on the declaration of independence" to be unconstitutional. On 15
March 2014, the Council of Europe's Venice Commission for Democracy through Law
(Venice Commission) opined that the referendum would be unconstitutional and
illegitimate.9 A draft United Nations Security Council resolution urging states not to
recognize the results of the referendum failed to pass on 15 March 2014 following Russia's
veto and China's abstention.10 On 27 March 2014, the United Nations General Assembly
adopted Resolution 68/262 in which it emphasized "that the referendum held in the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol on 16 March 2014, having no
validity, cannot form the basis for any alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic
of Crimea or of the city of Sevastopol."n
Notwithstanding these condemnations, on 16 March 2014, Crimea's local authorities held
a referendum on whether Crimea should secede from Ukraine to join the Russian
Federation. A day later, it was announced that 97 percent of the population had voted to
join Russia. Consequently, the Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree recognizing
Crimea as an independent state and singed agreements with Crimea's leadership declaring
Crimea and the city of Sevastopol part of the Russian Federation. Subsequently, the
Russian Parliament adopted a law accepting the new regions as parts of the Russian
On 7 March 2014, acting President Turchynov signed a decree suspending the Crimean Parliament's Order of 6
March 2014 to hold a referendum on territorial integrity and the Crimean Parliament's resolution authorizing the
16 March referendum as violating the Ukrainian Constitution and laws. On 11 March 2014, the Ukrainian
Parliament issued a statement demanding that the Crimean Parliament immediately revise its resolution to
comply with the national law. Moreover, Ukraine's Minister of Justice, Ombudsman and Chair of the Council of
Judges, have all publiclycondemned the referendum as unconstitutional. See Bilych etal., supro note 2, at 21.
See Dec.of the Const. Ct.of Ukraine, No.02-rp/2014 (Mar. 14, 2014).
Dec. ofthe Const. Ct. of Uraine, No. 03-rp/2014 (Mar. 20, 2014).
See Venice Comm'n for Democracy Through Law, Opinion on "Whether the Decision Taken by the Supreme
Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimeo in Ukraine to Organize a Referendum on Becoming a Constituent
Territory of the Russian Federation or Restoring Crimea's 1992 Constitution is Compatibie with Constitutional
Principles," COUNCIL OF EUR. (Mar. 21, 2014),
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/docurments/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2014)002-e.
10 See UN Security Council Action on Crimea Referendum Blocked, UN NEWS CENTRE (Mar. 15, 2014),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=47362P.VQHFPOFOghQ (last visited June 16, 2015).
" G.A. Res. 68/262, para. 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/262 (Mar. 27, 2014).
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Federation.1 2 By March 2015, even President Putin was ready to admit that the plan "to
bring Crimea back into Russia" had been orchestrated weeks before the referendum."
The 2014 conflict surrounding the status of Crimea not only reflects a contentious political
issue in Ukraine, in Russia and in between the two countries,14 but also raises imperative
questions from the perspective of constitutional theory. Of those, one will be the particular
focus of this contribution: the tension between the unamendable commitment to
territorial integrity in Ukraine's constitution and the reality of the country's territorial
fragmentation following the 2014 Crimean crisis. We are thus interested in the protection
of territory, as inscribed in the eternity clause of Ukraine's constitution, as an instantiation
of the question raised by Zoran Oklopcic in his contribution to this volume: "[W]hat
happens to the authority of ... a constitutional order when a fluid and malleable identity
fractures and disappears, and when competing political identities crystalize, instead?"s
This article reflects on the protection of territorial integrity in the Ukrainian constitution,
and especially within its provision of unamendability, against the backdrop of the 2014
Crimean crisis. At the general level, we examine if constitutional theory can offer answers
when confronted with the apparent inefficacy of a constitutional claim to eternity. More
specifically, we focus on what the Ukrainian case can teach us about the implications of
designating territorial integrity or indivisibility as an eternal/unamendable constitutional
12 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RIGHTS IN RETREAT: ABUSES IN CRIMEA 35 (2014). The historic and ethnic relationship
shared by Russia and Crimea could explain the interest and the will of the government in Moscow to act on behalf
of the Russian community in the Crimea, and conversely a sympathy within Crimea towards Russia. See, e.g.,
PhilIp Chase, Conflict in the Crimea: An Examination of Ethnic Conflict Under the Contemporary Model of
Sovereignty, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 219, 227-29, 243 (1996); Roman Solchanyk, Crimea: Between Ukraine and
Russia, in CRIMEA: DYNAMICS, CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS 3, 4 (Maria Drohobycky ed., 1995). For a study on the
trust-building between the Crimean population and Russia and the promotion of pro-Russian separatism in
Crimea, see Lada L. Roslycky, Russia's Smart Power in Crimea: Sowing the Seeds of Trust, 11 SOUTHEAST EUR. &
BLACK SEA STUDS. 299 (2011).
Putin Reveals Secrets of Russia's Crimea Takeover Plot, BBC NEWS (Mar. 9, 2015),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-31796226 (last visited June 16, 2015).
14 See generally Chase, supra note 12; Natalie Mychajlyszyn, The OSCE in Crimea, 9 HELSINKI MONITOR 30, 36-37
(1998); Doris Wydra, The Crimea Conundrum: The Tug of War Between Russia and Ukraine on the Questions of
Autonomy and Self-Determination, 10 INT'L]. MINORITY & GROuP RTs. 111 (2003); David R. Marples & David F. Duke,
Ukraine, Russia, and the Question of Crimea, 23 NATIONALITIES PAPERS: J. NATIONALISM & ETHNICITY 261 (1995).
Interestingly, it has been argued that the primary source of Instability in Crimea lIes with Ukrainian political and
commercial interests and not with ethnic claims or geopolitics. See Tetyana Malyarenko & David J. Galbreath,
Crimea: Competing Self Determination Movements and the Politics at the Centre, 65 ELUROPE-ASIA STUDs. 912
(2013).
15 See Zoran Oklopric, The Idea of Early-Conflict Constitution-Making: The Conflict in Ukraine Beyond Territorial
Rights and Constitutional Paradoxes, 16 GERMAN LJ. 658, 659 (2015).
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principleiC Building on insights from the Crimean crisis, we argue that the unamendable
protection of territorial integrity is an especially ineffective type of eternity clause because
it is subject to both the internal threat of secession and the external risk of forceful
annexation. The preservative promise of unamendable territorial integrity is severely
curtailed by this double vulnerability, even when backed by a constitutional court with far-
reaching powers of judicial review. Territorial integrity as an eternal constitutional
principle then remains merely aspirational. Moreover, we contend that the act of
entrenching territorial protection as an unamendable principle is in clear tension with the
idea of popular sovereignty and with mechanisms for expressing popular will. This tension
provides further evidence to support Stephen Tierney's insight that the principle of
democracy is deeply unsettling for constitutional law.17 The uncertainty surrounding
territorial change in constitutional law and theory, we conclude, is not alleviated by
unamendable protections of territorial integrity.
The article proceeds by an examination of the constitutional protection of territorial
integrity in Ukraine's constitutional architecture in Section B. We do so in several steps.
First, we explore Ukraine's general constitutional arrangements of territorial organization
and Crimea's place within those. Second, we focus on the unamendability protection of the
territorial integrity within the Ukrainian constitution. Third, we study the concurrent
adoption of constitutional review of proposed constitutional amendments in Ukralne and
its relevance to the protection of unamendability. In Section C we outline the functions of
unamendable constitutional provisions and further analyze the unamendability of
territorial integrity in a comparative perspective. Section D builds on insights from the
previous sections in order to draw out major lessons from the Crimean crisis, regarding the
tension between popular sovereignty and commitments to unamendability of the
territorial integrity, as well as the limited effectiveness and risks of unamendability in the
area of territorial integrity.
] In this paper, we use the term unamendability to describe the limitation on the constitutional amendment
power from amending certain principles or institutions. Provisions which explicitly protect constitutional subjects
from amendments are often termed "eternity clauses." For a note on this terminology and Its normative
implication, see Yaniv Roznai, Unamendability and the Genetic Code of the Constitution, EUR. REv. PUB. L.
(forthcoming 2015). Also, we use the terms "territorial indivisibility" and "territorial integrity" interchangeably.
Nevertheless, it can be argued that there is a distinction between territorial indivisibility and territorial Integrity.
The former emphasizes the negation of secession whereas the latter carries a dual aspect: Internal-which
opposes secession-and external-which emphasizes protection against foreign aggression or forcible
encroachment of the territory. See Venice Comm'n for Democracy Th rough Law, Self-Determination andSecession
in Constitutional Law, COUNCIL Or LUR. (Jan. 12, 2000),
http://www.ven ice .coe.i nt/webforms/docu ments/default.aspx? pdffi e=CDL-I NF(2000)002-.
17See generally, Stephen Tierney, Sovereignty and Crimea: How Referendum Democracy Complicates Constituent
Power in MultinationalSocieties, 16 GERMAN LJ. 523 (2015).
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B. Ukraine and the Unamendability of Territorial Integrity
L Territorio Arrangements in the Ukrainion Constitution
Constitutional commentators tend to ignore the territorial question surrounding the
(re-)emergence of a state, instead tending to grapple with the question of who is 'we, the
people."' Thus, it is perhaps surprising to note that a complex definitional attempt was
not made at the time of Ukraine's independence, which some scholars have termed an
"overwhelming indifference to the so-called 'national question,"' that is, who and on what
terms constituted the 'nation."' 9 Others have pointed to the Ukrainian leaders' rejection
of notions of "Ukraine for Ukrainians" and their adherence instead to a project of
"statehood for all of its peoples" at that time; this in turn is said to have resulted in an
overwhelming vote in favor of independence. 0 What resulted in the early days of
independence was thus "a pluralist, civic approach to the conception of a political
community," and ethnos was shunned in favor of "a political-territorial conception of
nationhood."
Once the constitution-making process got under way in the mid-nineties, however, the
question on the nature of the political community displayed its true contested colors.
Pitted against each other were the political right in Ukraine, with its emphasis on the
"Ukrainian people" as the distinctive and titular majority, and the political left, which spoke
of the "people of Ukraine" in an attempt to define it in territorial terms, 2 According to the
former, national minorities were accepted and protected as "state-forming communities,"
but the new civic nation was to be built around the core, Ukrainian ethnosf Conversely,
the Left wanted a supra-ethnic definition of the people, wherein multi-ethnicity could be
asserted and preserved.24
Without a centrist alternative and needing to reach a compromise, the Right's positlon was
enshrined in the Ukrainian constitution, notably in its preamble and provisions on state
is An excepton here is Zoran Oklopcic, Provincializing Constitutional Pluralism, 5 TRANSNAT'L LEGAL THEORY 331-63
(2014).
19 KATARYNA WOLCZUK, THE MOULDING OF UKRAINE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS or STATE FORMATION 88 (2002).
20 See Roman Solchanyk, The Politics of State Buidding: Centre-Periphery Relations in Post-Soviet Ukraine, 46
EUROPE-ASIASTUDS. 47, 65 (1994).
WOLCZLK, supro note 19, at 90.
22 Id. at 167-232.




language and symbolsi For this reason, some have listed Ukraine among those
post-communist countries having enshrined "a dubious and contested definition of
nationhood" in their constitution.26 More importantly, this brief foray into the debates
surrounding constitution-drafting in Ukraine highlights the disputed nature of the political
community in whose name the constitutional text was to be enacted. Such clashes
between "competing and mutually exclusive models of statehood",2  serve to further
illustrate the incursions between state and constitution-making which Oklopcic and Arato
both discuss in this volume.29 As we note below, the constitutional arrangements
surrounding Crimea's status further strengthened this notion of a civic state, 29 to the
exclusion of competing-and not insignificant-visions.
The territorial question relates not just to the enforcement of external boundaries which
statehood requires, but also to the internal administrative map reflecting or holding
together the polity. This internal structure is occasionally also shrouded in unamendability,
whether of the unitary state, such as in Romania, or of the federal structure, such as in
Germany and Brazil.31 While Ukraine's provision of unamendability speaks of "territorial
indivisibility" without further specifications, Article 2 of the constitution defines Ukraine
as a unitary state and refers to its territory "within its present borders" as indivisible and
inviolable. A short excursion into Ukraine's territorial arrangements, and the special status
afforded Crimea, will, however, reveal the borders to have been less clear-cut.
Id. Although the preamble spealks of "the Ukrainian people-citizens of Ukrane of all nationalities," thus
seemingly striking a compromise between the two positions, other provisions in the constitution, for example
Article 11, refer to the centrality of the Ukrainian nation to the state and the latter's duty to support its
consolidation and development. See WOLCZUK, supro note 19, at 228.
Irina Culic, State Building and Constitution Writing in Central and Eastern Europe After 1989, 1 REGIO -
MINORITIES, POL., Soc'y 56 (2003).
27 WOLCZUK, supro note 19, at 180.
2 See OIklopcic, supro note 15. See generally, Andrew Arato, internaotionalRole in State-Making in Ukraine: The
Promise of a Two-Stage Constituent Process 16 GERMAN LJ. 691 (2015); Culic, supra note 26, at 57 (speaking of
state-building in post-communist states as "vigorous nation building" associated to a "remedial and assertive
nationalism").
2 See WOLCZUK, supra note 19, at 95.
3On the process of narrative construction of national identity in Ukraine, see Karina V. Korostelina, Mapping
Nationo Identity Norratives in Ukraine, 41 NATIONALITIES PAPERS:1. NATIONALISM & ETHICITY 293 (2013).
r1 For comparative studies on unamendability, see MARIE-FRANCOISE RIGAUx, LA THEORIE DEs LIMITEs LATERIELLES A
L'EXERCICE DE LA FONcTION CONSTITUANTE (1985); Sharon Weintal, Eternal Clauses in the Constitution (2005)
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Hebrew University of Jerusalem) (on file with authors); Yaniv Roznal, Unconstitutional
Constitutional Amendments: A Study of the Nature and Limits of Constitutional Amendment Powers (2014)
(unpublished D.Phil. thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science) (on file with authors); Richard
Albert, Constitutional Handcuffs, 42 ARe. ST. L. J.663 (2010).
A2 See infro Section B.11.
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Territorial integrity, as a central feature within Ukrainian constitutionalism, already
appeared in the 1990 Declaration of the State Sovereignty of Ukraine alongside other
important principles such as national state sovereignty and self-determination3  The Act of
Ukraine's Independence Declaration of August 1991 expressly states that "the territory of
Ukraine is integral and inviolable."34 The principle continued to be a central feature during
the constitution-making process. The draft constitution of 27 May 1993 embodied the
"fundamental political accommodation made to Crimea over the spring and summer of
1992 to curb the threat of Crimean secession."" In the draft constitution as amended on
26 October 1993, the first chapter entitled "Fundamentals of Constitutional Order" was
modified to "General Provisions" and extended by the addition of various articles.
Ukraine's sovereignty was added in Article 2, and its second part was complemented with
the statement on the integrity and inviolability of the territory of the state. Territorial
integrity is considered such an important public interest that it is also recognized in the
constitution-alongside national security and public order-as a legitimate interest which
justifies the limitation of fundamental rights, such as freedom of thought and speech.37
Chapter IX of the Ukrainian constitution of 1996 specifies the state's territorial structure.
According to Article 132 "the territorial structure of Ukraine is based on the principles of
unity and integrity of state territory [and] combination of centralization and
decentralization in the exercise of state power." '3 According to Article 133, "the system of
the administrative and territorial structure of Ukraine is composed of the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea, oblasts, districts, cities, city districts, settlements and villages."39
Ukraine's choice of a unitary territorial model was not inevitable. Indeed, as one author
put it, "[a]t first sight, Ukraine is custom-made for far-reaching regionalization or even
federalism." 40 The same author describes the eventual choice for a unitary state as
3 See DECLARATION OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY (Ukr. 1990).
A4 PAUL R. MAGocSI, A HISTORY or UKRAINE: THE LAND AND ITS PEOPLES 723 (2010) (citing DECLARATION or INDEPENDENCE
(Ukr. 1991)).
Keenan H. Hohol, The Draft Constitution of Ukraine:An Overview, 1 REV. CONST.STUD. 246, 276 (1993-1994).
See v. Shapoval, History of Constitutional Organization of Modern Ukrainiaon State, 2011 L, UKR. LEcALJ. 385, 410
(2011).
See UKRAYNSKA KONSTITUZIYA June 28, 1996, ch. II, art. 34 (UI<r.); Richard C.O. Rezle, The Ukrainian Constitution:
Interpretation of the Citizens' Rights Provisions, 31 CASEW. RES. J. INT'L L. 169, 190--92 (1999).
UKRAYNSKA KONSTITUZIYA, June 28, 1996, ch. IX, art. 132 (Ukr.).
On local governments In Ukraine, see S. Serlogina, Constitutional-Legal Regulation of Local Self Government in
Ukraine and Directions for its improvement, 2012 L. UKR. LEGAL]. 65.
4D Kataryna Wa czuk, Catching up with 'Europe'? Constitutional Debates on the Territorial-Administrative Model in
independent Ukraine, 12 REGIONAL& FED. STUDs. 65 (2002).
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stemming from a desire to "return to Europe," but in the early days of independence,
Ukraine's political elites wavered between centralization and federalism. The latter was
promoted by its supporters as a solution to regional economic needs, as a means to bolster
the democratic credentials of the new state, and as an answer to multi-ethnicity. The
federal idea was lost during constitutional drafting for several reasons. Strategically, its
supporters appear to have failed to put forth an alliance to promote it.4  More
fundamentally, however, it was seen as a destabilizing force-in the former federal Soviet
Union, resulting in dissolution;43 In Russia, given the bloody experience with separatist
forces and in Ukraine, on account of federalism's potential to perpetuate, mobilize and
legitimate centrifugal forces in the country.44 As Oleh Protsyk describes it, "the
unwillingness to decentralize also was informed by expectations that such a policy would
intensify destructive centrifugal tendencies in a polity that was only recently established
and whose regional differences were strong and well-articulated." 45 Federalism thus
became taboo for the political establishment.46 In the end, a unitary territory was
perceived to be more likely to lead to an integrated society and to subordinate sub-state
interests to those of the center. Within this unitary framework, decentralization and the
regulation of self-government were also left underdeveloped, not so much "for a fear of
rigidity and over-regulation, but rather the lack of a coherent conception of the territorial
distribution of power and centre-periphery relations,'48
The striking exception to all this is Crimea, which enjoys-as the only region where the
majority of the population belongs to an ethnic minority-a special status with significant
independence, albeit remaining a constituent part of Ukraine.49 The historical background
41 See WOLCZUK, supra note 19, at 151.
42 See id. at 152.
43 ThIs is also reflected in the fact that of all former Soviet states, only Russia has a federal structure today.
Interestingly, in a first attempt of constitutionalism initiated by the Tsar in an effort to maintain order and
authority, the Russian Fundamental Laws of 1906 declared, "[T]he Russian state is one and indivisible." William
Partlett & Eric Ip, The Death of Socialist Law? (2015) (unpublished paper) (on file with authors).
44 See WOLCZUK, supra note 19, at 153-54; see also Gwendolyn Sasse, The 'New' Ukraine: A State of Regions, 11
RECIONAL & FED. STUDS. 69, 82 (2001).
41 Olen Protsyk, Majority-Minority Relations in the Ukraine, J. ETHNOPOLITICS & MINORITY ISSUES EUR. 1, 8 (2008),
http://www.ecmi.de/fileadmin/downlcads/publications/JEMIE/2008/issue%201/1-2008-Protsyk.pdf.
4h See Sasse, supra note 44, at 81; GWENDOLYN SASSE, THE CRIMEA QUESTION: IDENTITY, TRANSITION, AND CONrLICT 25-26
(2007); see also Bohdan A. Futey, Ukraine's Draft Constitution Meets Political Reality, 2 E. EUR. CONST. REv. 15
(1993)
4
/See WOLCZUK, supra note 19, at 244.
48 Id. at 241.
49 See Bilych et al., supra note 2, at 20-21; Gwendolyn Sasse, Conflict Prevention in a Transition State: The
Crimean issue in Post-Soviet Ukraine, 8 NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POL. 1, 1-26 (2002).
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is important. Crimea has held a special status both in the USSR and in independent
Ukraine. Its multiethnic composition and geostrategic location have ensured this
throughout its modern history, with the region being granted a special autonomy status at
various times in its history. 0 The region's ethno-territorial distinctiveness, in fact, has been
said to provide the rationale for its post-Soviet autonomy, even if the latter has been
"defined in territorial rather than ethnic terms. " In 1954, the Soviet Union transferred the
Crimean peninsula from the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic to the
administration of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. This marked what some have
termed "the real beginning of Crimea's link to the Ukrainian state."52 Known as the "gift,"
the rationale for this transfer remains elusive, and its continued currency in Russlan and
Ukrainian politics makes Crimea an example "of how some Soviet-era decisions, especially
those involving boundary changes or shifts in competences, assumed a radically different
dynamic in the post-Soviet era."53 Subsequent to the transfer, Crimea became a territory of
the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic within the Soviet Union and remained so for
thirty-seven years until 1991 with the collapse of the USSR. When Ukraine gained its status
as an independent nation, Crimea's status was constitutionally renegotiated in what
turned out to be a protracted process.S4 It was finally granted the status of an
"autonomous republic" with the 1996 adoption of the Ukrainian constitution.
The initial draft of the Ukrainian Constitution comprised of merely limited autonomy rights
granting Crimea the status of a rayon, but a constitutional framework was created
especially for the Autonomous Republic of Crimea within Chapter X of the new
constitution.55 The protracted negotiation process between the center and Crimean
authorities, culminating in granting the region this autonomy status and the adoption of its
constitution in 1998, has been pointed to as a potential explanation for the avoidance of
conflict in the region in the aftermath of Ukraine's independence. Gwendolyn Sasse has
made this argument, explaining that the stop-go institutionalization of Crimean autonomy
post-1990 played an important conflict-preventing role.56 The process was mired in
confusion over who exercised legitimate authority in the region, she argues, but the very
fact that power players attempted to resolve the issue constitutionally is significant.7




'4 See id. at 175-200.
See Wydra, supro note 14, at 124.
See SASSE, supro note 46, at 10.
" See i. at 175.
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Chapter X regulates the relations between Ukraine and Crimea and defines the regional
legal authority of Simferopol vis-2-vis the central government in Kiev. It emphasizes the
territorial unity of Ukraine and defines Crimea as an inseparable constituent part of
Ukraine. Crimea's authority is determined by, limited by and derived from the Ukrainian
constitution. While Crimea is entitled to have its own constitution, neither the latter nor
other laws can contradict the constitution or the laws of Ukraine.58 According to Article
136, the authority, procedures and operation of Crimea's governmental institutions are
determined by the constitution and laws of Ukraine and by legal acts of the Verkhovnar
Rodo [Parliament] of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea according to its competencies,
which are mainly of local importance.
In the same vein, the Crimean constitution's first Article declares that the Autonomous
Republic is an integral part of Ukraine and must govern itself in accordance with the
constitution. 3 Article 2(2) of the constitution expressly states that in a conflict between
normative acts of the Republic of Crimea and the constitution of Ukraine, the latter
prevails because it is supreme over all other laws and regulations.6f This precedence can be
illustrated with at least one significant decision of the Ukrainian Constitutional Court,
which in 2001 invalidated parts of four Crimean normative acts and declared that only the
Verkhovna Roda in Kiev could be called "parliament"; the Crimean Verkhovna Rodo was
merely the "representative organ" of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the region's
constitution one of its many "normative-legal acts.""' Moreover, the Crimean constitution
invokes "state guarantees of the status, powers and the right of property of the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea," a clear effort on the part of regional authorities to
prevent any downgrading of the region's status. However, there is nothing to echo this in
the Ukrainian constitution, leaving the region's status vulnerable to action taken at the
center.6 4
"See UKRAYNSKA KONSTITUZIYA June 28, 1996, ch. X, art. 135 (Ukr.);see also Bilych et al, supro note 2, at 20-21.
"See UKRAYNSKA KONSTITUZIYAJune 28, 1996, ch. X, art. 137 (Ukr.); Wydra, supra note 14, at 124-25.
6See THE CONSTrfUTION OF THE AUTONoMOus REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA Oct. 21, 1998, ch. 1, art. 1.
See id. ch. 1, art. 2(2).
Dec. of the Const. Ct. of Ukraine, No. 01-rp/2001 (Feb. 27, 2001). See also SASSE, supra note 46, at 206.
6 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE AUTONoMous REPUBLICOF CRIMEA Oct. 21, 1998, ch. 1, art. 3(2); seeSAssE, supro note 46, at
202.
64 See SASSE, supra note 46, at 204.
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The constitutional commitment to a unitary state "a priori excludes any form of local,
territorial autonomy of a federal type."6' As such, the existence of the Autonomous Region
of Crimea within a state so ardently declared unitary highlights the potentially
contradictory nature of Ukraine's state-building project: "strengthening central state
capacity within an institutionalized state unit inherited from the Soviet period, while
simultaneously engaging with sub-national demands for more autonomy."6 6 The tension
between centralization and decentralization was inscribed in the Ukrainian constitution
when the asymmetric autonomy arrangement was set up.6 Thus, the special status of
Crimea has led commentators to refer to Ukraine as a "state of regions," an example of a
"federalized society," or a "regionalized unitary state."68 This was met with skepticism by
those worried it would result in "years of constitutional litigation and political instability""9
but could also be seen as an unavoidable compromise given Crimea's historical
separateness. Moreover, authors like Sasse writing before the 2014 crisis saw this only
partially elaborated autonomous status as a guarantee of Crimea posing "less of a threat to
the Ukrainian state, and [being] therefore less likely to be contested or eroded by the
center"; 70 in other words, part of a "long game" Kiev played with Crimea in order to
weaken the regionalist and separatist movements within the region. 71
Even when there is no contradiction between provisions on the center versus on Crimea,
vagueness in the national constitution is problematic. The latter's generic references to the
ability of Crimea to self-govern result in Crimean authority remaining dependent on Kiev's
goodwill. 72 On the one hand, after the adoption of the Ukrainian constitution that
recognized and constitutionalized Crimea's special autonomous status and the approval of
the Crimean constitution by the Ukrainian Parliament, it appeared that the situation had
Oh Paul Blokker, Constitutional Politics, Constitutional Texts and Democratic Variety in Centrol and Eastern Europe
20-221 (Sussex European Institute, Working Paper No. 105, 2008).
Sasse, supro note 44, at 70.
6 Id.
Id. at 69, 96.
"' Hohol, supro note 35, at 276-77 (citing Marc Lalonde, Second Symposium Notes (June 20-22, 1993)
(unpublished symposium notes, International Symposium on the Draft Constitution of Ukraine)).
7SASSE, supra note 46, at 256.
"Id. at 255.
72 The Venice Commission, commenting on Ukraine's 1996 constitutional draft, remarked that it "does not have
many provisions on the matter [of Crimean autonomy] and leaves a large space of discretion to the Ukrainian
legislator." Venice Comm'n for Democracy Through Law, Opinion on the Oroft Constitution of Ukraine, COUNCILOF
EUR. 17 (May 21, 1996), http://www.venice.coe.int/webfarms/docurments/default.aspx?pdffIle=CDL-
INF(1996)006-e (last visited June 16, 2015).
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been stabilized and that "secession is no longer an issue where Crimea is concerned."73 On
the other hand, notwithstanding its autonomous status, Crimea remained in a constant
political struggle with the center over the basics of governing. Its different political
options were evident during the 2002 demonstrations and the 2004 Orange Revolution, for
instance, both of which seemed to "largely bypass[] Crimea."
/1. Territorial Integrity os an Unamendable Principle in the Ukrainian Constitution
Ukrainian formal amendment procedure creates a constitutional hierarchy. At the bottom,
there is a low threshold for ordinary constitutional amendments which requires proposal
by either the President or one-third of the national legislature, adoption by a majority of
the national legislature, followed by a subsequent two thirds vote in the national
legislature. At the middle level of the hierarchy, the constitution necessitates a proposal by
either the President or two-thirds of the national legislature, adoption again by a two
thirds vote in the national legislature, and ratification via national referendum in order to
amend the constitution's general principles, rules of elections and referendums, and the
amendment procedure itself. Finally, at the summit of the constitutional hierarchy, there
are human rights and freedoms, national independence, and territorial integrity which are
formally unamendable 7 E As Article 157 of the 1996 constitution stipulates: "The
Constitution of Ukraine shall not be amended if the amendments foresee the abolition or
restriction of human and citizens' rights and freedoms, or if they are oriented toward the
liquidation of the independence or violation of the territorial indivisibility of Ukraine." The
unamendable provision thus protects fundamental rights and the independence and
territorial indivisibility of Ukraine from infringements by constitutional amendments.
Should this limitation on the ability to amend the constitution as stipulated in Article 157
be regarded as an eternity clause? This question arises because the unamendability is
formulated as a principle-which is more a generalized guideline-rather than as a rule
Mychajiyszyn, supro note 14, at 36-37. Sasse, writing in 2007, also declared that "Kyiv has managed to
integrate Crimea into the new Ukrainian polity." SAssE, supro note 46, at 3.
See Robert Agranoff, Autonomy, Devolution and Intergovernmental Relations, 14 REGIONAL & FED. STUDs. 26, 38
(2004)
7 SAsE, supra note 46, at 219.
7 UKRAYNSKA KoNSTrfUZIYA June 28, 1996, ch. XIll, art. 154-57 (Ukr.). See Richard Albert, The Expressive Function of
Constitutional Amendment Rules, 59 McGILL L J. 225, 255-56 (2013).
7 UKRAYNSKA KoNSTrfUZIYA June 28, 1996, ch. XIII, art. 157 (Ukr.).
See Albert, supra note 31, at 687; Albert, supra note 76, at 255; see also Reze, supra note 37; Bohdan A. Futey,
Comments on the Constitution of Ukraine, 5 E. EUR. CONst. REv. 29, 30 (1996).
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requiring strict compliance.79 Due to its elasticity and semantic openness, unamendability
formulated as a general principle allows balancing and flexibility. As Denis Baranger
remarked with reference to the French constitution, "there is nothing objective or merely
procedural about such a standard as the 'integrity of the territory."" Therefore, the
content of the so-called eternal protection of territorial indivisibility may evolve and
change with time and in a social context; it allows debate, interpretation and
reinterpretation of its meaning.
Skeptics would argue that the commitment to territorial integrity is a declaration of
principle referring purely to securing the country's external borders and is thus by
definition constitutionally unenforceable. In other words, it is akin to a declaration of
independence: Mostly declaratory in nature and vulnerable to political reality rendering it
meaningless. This line of interpretation is only partially persuasive. First, one might argue
that this commitment can be understood as imposing a constitutional duty on the state
organs to defend the territorial integrity of the state or struggle for its re-establishment,
especially if read together with Article 17, which makes defending the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Ukraine a major state function.
Second, and more importantly, this provision should be read in the context of the entire
Ukrainian constitution, especially in conjunction with the strong judicial review powers
afforded to the constitutional court. Therefore, as we argue in greater detail in the
following section, this eternity clause appears intended to function as more than a non-
justiciable declaration of principle.
Ukraine's provision of unamendability thus needs to be read against the background of the
entire constitution, including the role of Ukraine's constitutional court as guardian of the
constitution and as protector of the territorial integrity. But before that, the
7 Dieter Conrad, Basic Structure of the Constitution and Constitutional Principles, in LAW & JUSTICE-AN ANTHOLOGY
186, 194 (Soli J. Sorabjee ed., 2003). On the distinction between principles and rules, see Ronald M. Dworkin, The
Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 25 (1967-1968); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 24 (1978); Robert
Alexy, On the Structure of Legal Principles, 13 RATIOJuRis 294, 295 (2000).
so Denis Baranger, The Language of Eternity: Judicial Review of the Amending Power in France (or the Absence
Thereof), 44 1SR. L, REV. 389, 404 (2011).
N Compare this with the following: Art. 104 of the constitution of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea (1991),
according to which the territorial integrity shall not be subject to reform, in conjunction with Art. 16, according to
which "All Equatorial-Guineans shall have the obligation to ... defend [the state's] ... territorial integrity and
national unity... "; the Bulgarian constitution (1991), according to Art. 2(2) of which "[t] he territorial integrity of
the Republic of Bulgaria shall be inviolable," also recognizes in the Preamble the "duty to guard the national and
state integrity of Bulgaria." See also Theodore Christakis, Self-Determination, Territorial Integrity and Foit
Accompi in the Case of Crimea, 75 ZAoRV/HEIDELBERC JiL 75 (2015) (arguing that more than eighty constitutions
out of the 108 the author reviewed "have wording showing that any unilateral attempt to secede should be




unamendability of territorial integrity must be squared with the possibly contradictory
territorial arrangements inscribed in the Ukrainian constitution.
It is not straightforward how Article 157's unamendable commitment to indivisibility, to
the extent that it was meant as more than declarative, can be squared with the special
provisions on Crimea." Although the latter's status was confirmed as exceptional by all
sides during the constitution-making process, maintaining Ukraine's territorial integrity
remained of equal if not higher concern. On the one hand, Article 134 of the constitution
declares Crimea 'an inseparable constituent part of Ukraine."84 Similarly, the hard-fought
constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea speaks of the region as "an integral
part of Ukraine." 3 On the other hand, Article 138(2) lists the organization and conduct of
local referendums within the competence of Crimean authorities, while the Crimean
constitution declares "sovereignty of the people" as a fundamental principle under article
2(1)." More confounding still is Article 7(2) of the Republic's constitution, which states:
"The territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea may be changed if it should be so
resolved by a republican (local) referendum and by a resolution of the Supreme Rada
[Council] of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea pursuant to the Constitution of
Ukraine."8 The latter's compliance with the constitution of Ukraine was certified by the
Constitutional Court of Ukraine in the case on the constitution of the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea of 2003.88
Thus, the most plausible interpretation of "territorial indivisibility" is compatible with, and
respectful of, Crimea's status. In other words, what the drafter plausibly sought to render
"eternal" or unamendable was the external territorial status quo at the time of
constitutional adoption-the integrity of Ukraine's external boundaries, rather than limit
internal territorial reorganization. The Venice Commission seems to support this
interpretation: 'The state's indivisibility is not to be confused with its unitary character,
and therefore consorts with regionalism and federalism."
The characteristics of state indivisibility and unity are strongly Inked. See St~phane Pierr&-Caps, Constitutional
Non-Recognition of Minorities in the Context of Unitary States: An Insurmountable Obstacle? in THE PARTICIPATION
or MINORITIES IN PUBLIC LIrE 11-12 (2011).
" See WOLCZUK, supra note 19, at 159.
"UKRAYNSKA KoNSTrfUZIYA June 28, 1996, ch. X, art. 134 (Ukr.) (emphasis added).
THE CONSTITUTION OFTHE AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA October 21, 1998, ch. 1, art. 1(1).
UKRAYNSKA KoNSTrIUZIYA June 28, 1996, ch. X, art. 138(2) (Ukr.); id. ch. 1, art. 2(1).
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE AUTONOMous REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA October 21, 1998, ch. 2, art. 7(2).
Dec. of the Const. Ct. of Ukraine, No. 01-rp/2003 (Jan. 16, 2003).
N Venice Commission, supra note 16, at 3.
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Even if that were the case, however, events predating the 2014 Crimean referendum
should have already raised the alarm concerning the constitutional text's contradictlons) 0
Notwithstanding the autonomous status of Crimea, the accepted understanding in Ukraine
is that Regional Self-Government entities must be 'loyal to and in compliance with
territorial integrity." 9' Thus, even though many in Crimea consider Russia as their
homeland, 'the Ukrainian leadership, while accepting that Crimean Russians were oriented
towards Russia, had always drawn the line on any attempt at infringing its territorial
integrity.; 92 Furthermore, the fear of "separatism, secession, country breakdown and
disintegration" shaped Ukraine's constitutional arrangements including its fundamental
constitutional principles as reflected in Article 157, and its perception of minority issues. 3
Ukraine is by no means unique amidst post-communist countries in its sensitive
constitutional balancing act: Seeking to build a strong, unitary state while ensuring,
sometimes reluctantly, minority accommodation in a multi-ethnic society.4 References to
territorial integrity abound in post-communist constitutions, alongside declarations of
political independence and an embrace of popular sovereignty. 5  Moreover, the
constitutional protection of territorial integrity helps to expose common fears of territorial
disintegration and loss of independence. However, where they are accompanied by a
constitutional court empowered to enforce such provisions, the unamendability of
territorial integrity moves beyond mere proclamation and into constitutional doctrine.
so The 1994 Crimean referendum, which proceeded despite being declared illegal by the Ukrainian electoral
commission and President, returned positive answers to the questions of whether the region should have greater
autonomy, whether its citizens should hold dual Ukrainian-Russian citizenship, and whether the decrees of the
Crimean provincial President should have the status of law. See MARK CLARENCE WALKER, THE STRATEGIC USE OF
REFERENDUMS: POWER, LEGITIMACY, AND DEMOCRACY 108 (2003).
1 V. Volkay, Problems of Improving the Constitutional Foundations of Self-Government in Ukraine, 2012 LAW UKR.
LEGALJ. 88, 98.
TARAs Kuzio, UKRAINE: STATE AND NATION BUILDING 87 (2002).
Protsyk, supra note 45, at 1-2. See generally Yegor Vasylyev, Legal Transplants in the New Constitutions:
Comporative Study of Ukraine and Poland, 4 J. ELURASIAN L. (2011).
9 See Culic, supra note 26, at 44-47 (providing an overview of post-communist countries having incorporated
such constitutional provisions).
c' RETT R. LUDWIKOWSKI, CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN THE REGION OF FORMERSOVIET DOMINANCE 196-97 (1996).
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IlL The Constitutional Court as Guardian of the Territory
Ukraine constitutional system protects human rights and recognizes the practice of judicial
review.96 The Constitutional Court not only has authority to judicially review ordinary
legislation, but can also give judgments on proposed constitutional amendments through a
priori judicial review.97 According to Article 159 of the Ukrainian constitution, a preliminary
opinion of the Constitutional Court regarding the conformity of proposed amendments
with the requirements of Articles 157 and 158 of the Constitution-an ex onte review-is
an essential stage of the procedure in order for a constitutional amendment to be adopted
by the Verkhovna Rada." In other words, the preventive review by the Constitutional
Court on the compatibility of draft amendments to the requirements of Articles 157 and
158 is a prerequisite for the Verkhovna Rada to continue and to adopt the proposed
amendments. 9 Thus, although the Constitutional Court's discretion is limited by the
explicit criteria for review as stipulated in the constitution, albeit always with some leeway
because these are vague principles, the Constitutional Court is clearly granted a veto role
within the amendment process.1oo Indeed, in several opinions, the Constitutional Court has
held that proposed amendments contradict the provision of unamendability and should be
revised.' 01
See, e.g., V. Kampo, Some issues of The Development of Constitutional Justice in Ukraine, 2011 LAw UKR. LEGAL].
196 (2011); V. Tykhyl, The Legal Nature, Powers, Decisions and Opinions of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine,
2011 LAW UKR. LEGAL J. 206, 207-08 (2011); Serhiy Holovaty, Ukraine in Transition: From Newly Emerged
Democracy Towards Autocracy?, 26 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 267 (2000).
See generally Roznai, supra note 31; KEMAL GOZLER, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS-A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 5-7 (2008).
9 UKRAINE CONST. (1996), art. 159; Tykhyi, supro note 96, at 207-08 (2011); GABOR HALMAI, PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM 40 (2014); WOJCIECH SADURSKI, RIGHTS BEFORE COURTS: A STUDY or CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN
POSTCOMMUNIST STATES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 25, n. 116 (2014); see generally Futey, supra note 78
(discussing the Constitutional Court).
C See Dec. of the Const. Ct. af Ukraine, No. 13-rp/2008 (June 26, 2008) (regarding the constitutional petition of 47
National Deputies of Ukraine concerning the constitutionality of item 3.1, Chapter IV of the Law of Ukraine "On
the Constitutional Court of Ukraine"); see also Dec. of the Const. Ct. of Ukraine, No. 06-rp/2008 (Apr. 16, 2008)
(concerning a constitutional petition of the President of Ukraine for official interpretation of provisions of Articles
5.2, 5.3, 69, 72.2, 74, 94.2 and 156.1 of the Constitution), citedin Yu Barabash, Constitutional Reform and Stability
of the Constitutional System: Coflictoiogical-Legol Analysis of Systemic interlinkage, 2012 LAw UKR. LEGAL J. 116,
131 (2012), http://www.ccu.gov.ua/en/doccatalog/list?currDir=18147 (providing summaries in English).
u1 Oleh Protsyk, Troubled Semi-Presidentialism. Stability of the Constitutional System and Cabinet in Ukraine, 55
EUROPE-AsIA STUDS. 1077, 1089 (2003)
i01 For example, see the Opnion of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, in the case upon the appeal of the
Verkhovno Roda of Ukraine, providing an opinion regarding the constitutionality of introducing amendments to
Articles 80, 105, 126, and 149 of the Constitution of Ukraine for immunity to requirements of Arts. 157 and 158.
Op. of the Const. Ct. of Ukraine, No. 01-v/2012, (July 10, 2012) (finding the abolition of immunity of judges as
infringing upon their ability to conduct an independent, objective and fair justice for the purpose protecting
human and citizens' rights and freedoms), http://www.ccu.gov.ua/en/doccatalog/Ist?currDr=182897; see also
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An example of the veto role by the Constitutional Court in the amendment process is its
judgment of 30 September 2010. In 2004, the Ukrainian parliament considered an
important constitutional amendment that aimed to make substantial changes to the
organization of the executive branch. The draft amendment was duly submitted to the
Constitutional Court, which confirmed its admissibility. 0 2 In the course of the
parliamentary debates, the original text of the amendment was substantially modified, and
the final version was adopted without being resubmitted to the Constitutional Court for its
opinion.0 3  Six years later, 252 People's Deputies filed a constitutional complaint
challenging the procedural validity of the 2004 amendment before the Constitutional
Court. In its judgment, the Constitutional Court decided that because the amendment was
revised and approved by the Verkhovna Rada without the obligatory opinion of the
Constitutional Court, it was adopted in a procedural violation of Article 159 of the
constitution; thus it was declared unconstitutional and void.104 But that case concerned a
procedural review of the adoption of the amendment rather than a substantive review of
its content.
Interestingly, the Venice Commission questioned the legality and legitimacy of that
decision because the Constitutional Court conducted its review of the amendment after it
entered into force and the court only possessed authority to conduct a preliminary
review.los However, in an earlier decision in 2008, the Constitutional Court held that it also
Op. of the Const. Ct. of Ukraine, No. 1-v/2010, (Apr. 1, 2001) (providing an opinion on the constitutionality
conformity of amendments to Articles 80, 105, and 108 of the Constitution of Ukraine, concerning guaranteeing
immunities to certain officials, with the provisions of arts. 157 and 158 of the Constitution of Ukraine, in which
the court found that providing liability exemption of People's Deputies of Ukraine for statements that contain
insult or defamation in Parliament and its bodles might violate fundamental rights and freedoms),
http://www.ccu.gov.ua/en/doccatalog/Iist?currDir=108166; Kampo, supra note 96, at 196.
m2 Op. of the Const. Ct. of Ukraine, No. 03-v/2004, (Dec. 10, 2003); Op. of the Const. Ct. of Ukraine, No. 02-
v/2004, (Oct. 12, 2004), http://www.ccu.gov.ua/en/doccatalog/st?currDir=108166.
0 See Opinion on the Procedure of Amending the Constitution of Ukraine, Op. of the Eur. Comm'n for Democracy
Through Law (Venice Comm'n), No. 305/2004, para. 25 (Oct. 8-9, 2004),
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/docurments/defauIt.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2004)03D-e (expressing its
concern regardng the disregard for the role of the Constitutional Court In the amendment process).
1 See Dec. of the Const. Ct. of Ukraine, No. 20-rp/2010, (Sep. 30, 2010) (concerning the constitutionality of the
Law of Ukraine "On Introducing Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine," No. 2222-IV, (Dec. 8, 2004),
http://www.ccu.gov.ua/en/doccatalog/list?currDir=91909; see also Lech Garliclki & Zofia A. Garlicka, External
Review of Constitutional Amendments? International Law as a Norm of Reference, 44 ISR. L. REV. 343, 348, n. 8
(2011),
105 See Opinion on the Constitutional Situation in Ukraine, Op. of the Eur. Comm'n for Democracy Through Law
(Venice Comm'n), No. 599/2010, paras. 31-32 (Dec. 17-18 2010),
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/docurments/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD%282010%29044-e; The Venice
Commission added, at paragraphs 35-36: "It also considers highly unusual that far-reaching constitutional
amendments, including the change of the political system of the country-from a parliamentary system to a
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possessed the competence to exercise ex-post (rather than only ex-ante) constitutional
review of amendments to the constitution, even after these are adopted by the Verkhovno
Rodo. The reasoning was based on the fact that the constitution did not restrIct that
possibility and in order to adequately protect fundamental rights and freedoms, state
independence, and territorial integrity.106
In new democracies, constitutional courts often receive a central place as guarantors of
the constitution0 7 and even of the democratic integrity in conflicted societies.'0 The
Ukrainian Constitutional Court often acts as a mediator between political actors.109 It is
granted with a rare authority to take part in the constitutional amendment process and to
protect the provision of unamendability; most constitutional courts do not explicitly
possess such a competence.'10  Put differently, the Constitutional Court is the legal
guardian of territorial integrity-among other unamendable principles-and in its opinions
on draft amendments it reviews whether draft laws "are oriented toward the liquidation of
the independence or violation of the territorial indivisibility of Ukraine."'' Of course, it
parliamentary presidential one-are declared unconstitutional by a decision of the Constitutional Court after a
period of six years. The Commission notes however, that neither the Constitution of Ukraine nor the Law on the
Constitutional Court provide for a time-limit for contesting the constitutionality of a law before the CCU. As
Constitutional Courts are bound by the Constitution and do not stand above it, such decisions raise Important
questions of democratic legitimacy and the rule of law." Id.
1u See Dec. of the Const. Ct. of Ukraine, No. 13-rp/2008 (June 26, 2008) (regarding the constitutionality of
Chapter IV of the Law of Ukraine, "On the Constitutional Court of Ukraine," bythe appeal of Forty-Seven People's
Deputies of Ukraine), http://www.ccu.gov.ua/en/doccatalog/list?currDir=18147.
1u, Gabor Halmai, Unconstitutionol Constitutional Amendments: Constitutionol Courts as Guardians of the
Constitution? 19 CONSTELLATIONS 182 (2012); HALMAI, supra note 98, at 40.
18 See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Constitutionol Courts and Democrotic Hedging, 99 GEORGETOWN L. J. 961
(2011).
In Trevor L. Brown & Charles R. Wise, Constitutional Courts and Legislative-Executive Relations: The Case of
Ukroine, 119 POL. ScI. Q. 143, 155 (2004).
15o Of course, in some jurisdictions, courts have taken upon themselves such a judicial role, even without an
explicit authority in the constitution. See Yaniv Roznal, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments-The
Migration and Success of a Constitutionol Idea, 61 AM. J. COM. L. 657 (2013); ROZNAI, supro note 31; GOZLER, supro
note 97, at 5-7.
I The involvement of courts in questions of territory is not in Itself unique. See, e.g., Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700
(1868) (deciding that despite affiliation with the Confederacy during the Civil War, states did not-and cannot-
unilaterally secede from the United States; this was a celebrated decision of the U.S. Supreme Court). A more
contemporary notable example is the Canadian Secession of Quebec case, in which the Supreme Court held that
although a majority will of a people to secede, as expressed In a referendum, must be taken Into a consideration,
there are other important principles such as federalism, minority rights and the rule of law which must be
observed. According to the rule of law principle, secession of a province should be carried out according to the
Canadian constitutional rules which govern the amendment process. Moreover, the Court uncovered an
unwritten duty to negotiate in the event of a formal amendment on secession. See Reference re the Secession of
Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.), http://scc-cscIexum.com/decisIa-scc-csc/scc-csc/scc-
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might be questioned how the Constitutional Court can protect the unamendable principle
when faced with significant external pressures or with an overly political issue, such as a
referendum on the territory.1 12 What is clear is that this "judicial preview" mechanism
demonstrates that the unamendability of the territorial indivisibility was intended to be
judicially enforceable and not merely declaratory.
C. Formal Unamendability
1. The Functions of Unamendability
Formal unamendability usually takes place in the form of explicit constitutional provisions
that designate certain constitutional subjects-such as principles, rules, institutions, and
symbols-as unamendable through the formal constitutional amendment process. There is
a growing trend in global constitutionalism to provide for formal unamendability.' 3 The
"new" constitutional orders in Central and Eastern Europe following the collapse of
communism protect human rights and recognize the practice of judicial review. 114
Although some have argued that it would be a mistake for these new democracies to
import the German "fondness for unamendable provisions" as the vexing questions that
they face ought to be resolved in the political sphere rather than in constitutional courts,
many of these states adopted provisions of unamendabilityfC Among the states that
csc/en/1tem/1643/1ndex.do; see also Peter H. Russell, Can the Canadians Be a Sovereign People? The Question
Revisited, in CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 9, 22 (Stephen L. Newman ed., 2004);
Oklopcic, supra note 15.
" See, cf., Holovaty, supra note 96, at 281 ("Where a decision involves a significant issue of executive authority,
such as the recent referendum decision, there is a danger of significant external pressure being exerted an the
Court to reach a decision [favorable] for the executive."); see MARIA POPOVA, POLITICIZED JUSTICE IN EMERcINc
DEMOCRACIES: A STUDY OF COURTS IN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE (2012) (providing a comprehensive study of political pressure
on judicial Independence n Ukraine).
1A According to one study, between 1789 and 1944, almost twenty percent of all new constitutions Included
unamendable provisions, wnile, between 1945 and 1988, almost tnirty percent of new constitutions included
such provisions, and between 1989 and 2013, already over fifty percent of new constitutions include formal
unamendable provisions. See Roznai, supra note 16. Unamendability can also be implicit and judge-made through
judicial decisions; Roznai, supra note 110; RoZNAI, supra note 31; GOZLER, supra note 97.
114 Wiktor Oslatynski, Rights in New Constitutions of East Central Europe, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 111 (1994);
HERMAN SCHWARTZ, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE (2002); SADURSKI, supra note
98.
115 Stephen Holmes, Back to the Drawing Board: An Argument for Constitutional Postponement in Easter Europe, 2
E. EUR. CONST. REV. 21, 22 (1993).
116 See, e.g., CZECH REPUBLIC CONSTITUTION Dec. 16, 1992, art. 9; KAZAKHSTAN CONSTITUTION Aug. 30, 1995, art. 91(2);
MOLDOVA CONST. July 29, 1994), art. 142; ROMANIA CONST. Nov. 21, 1991, art. 152(1); LEVENT GONEN1, PROSPECTS FOR
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN POST-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES 372 (2002). On constitutional revisions in Eastern Europe, see
Stephen Holmes & Cass R. Sunstein, The Politics of Constitutional Revision in Eastern Europe, in RESPONDING TO
IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE Or CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 275 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995); Rett T.
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incorporate provisions of unamendability, the Ukrainian case is exceptional in the role it
assigns to the judiciary. The only other constitutions empowering the Constitutional Court
to adjudicate initiatives for revising the Constitution a piori to any amendment's adoption
11711- 19
are Kyrgyzstan, Kosovo," 8 and Romania.
Unamendability fulfills various functions.120 Preservation of the constitutional order and its
constitutive values is a principal aim of provisions on unamendability. Formal
unamendability functions as a barrier to change, aiming to afford additional protection to
certain principles by blocking the constitutional amendment process and in so doing
averting possible alteration of basic constitutive principles and core features of the
constitutional identity. Such protected fundamentals are considered by the constitution-
drafts as worthy to last for generations. Unamendability not only points to the importance
of the enshrined principle to the constitutional order but also supposedly functions as "a
perfect protection against impulsive rashness,"'2 ' reflecting a certain "amendophobio" that
the amendment process might be abused in order to repeal societies' basic values.122 At
the very least, unamendability and its institutional enforcement through judicial review
mechanisms may provide additional time for the people to reconsider their support for a
change of their core principles, thereby hindering revolutionary movements. 2 As Gregory
Ludwikowski, Constitutional Culture of the New East-Central European Democracies, 29 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1,
14-21 (2000-2001).
117 See Kyrgyzstan, 28 THE WORLD OF PARLIAMENTS-QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THE INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION 15 (2007)
(looking at the constitutional court in Kyrgyzstan where, on 14 September 2007, and without explicit authority,
the court annulled and changed two constitutional amendments on formal grounds, and in 2011 a constitutional
amendment endowed the constitutional court with an authority to provide its optnion during a preliminary
review of constitutional amendments).
"n See THE REP. or Kosovo CONST. June 15, 2008, arts. 113(9) and 144(3) (explicitly granting the Court authority of
an a priori review of proposed amendments and to examine whether proposed amendments diminish rights and
freedoms guaranteed by Chapter II of the Constitution. If the Court declared any proposed amendment as
"unconstitutional," the Assembly cannot vote on it). See Enver Hasani, Preventive Abstract Control of
Constitutional Amendments and Protection of The Head of State From Unconstitutional Dismissal: The Case of
Kosovo, 1 E DREJTA-LAW REVISTE PER tESHTJE JURIDIKE DHE SHOQERORE 105, 106 n. 188 (2003); Enver Hasan,
Constitutional Protection of the Head of State; The Case of Kosovo, 7 VIENNAJ. INT'L CONST. L. 128 (2013).
I1 See ROMANIA CONST. Nov. 21, 1991, art. 146(a); lon Deleanu & Emil Boc, The Control of the Constitutionality of
Laws in Romonia, 2 J. CONST. L. E. & CENT. EuR. 119, 120, 124 (1995); loan Deleanu, Separation of Powers-
Constitutional Regulation and Practice of the Constitutional Court, 3 J. CONST. L. E. & CENT. EUR. 57, 63 (1996);
Nicole Popa, The Constitutional Courtof Romania, Twelve Years of Activity: 1992-2004, Evolutions Over the Last
Three Years, CONsT. CT. BULLETIN, https://www.ccr.ro/Nr-7-2004 (last visited June 16, 2015).
'2 Albert, supra note 3178; Roznal, supro note 16.
121 Jon Elster, Majority Rule and individual Rights, in THE POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTs 120, 146 n. 35 (Obrad Savi6 ed.,
2002).
122 Ronal, supra note 16.
1 BRUCEACKERMAN, WETHE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONs 20-21 (1993).
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Fox and Georg Nolte remark with reference to the German provision of unamendability,124
the framers of the German Basic Law believed that if a provision of unamendability "had
been presented in the Weimar constitution, Hitler would have been forced to violate the
constitution openly before assuming virtually dictatorial power. . . . [G]iven the traditional
orderly and legalistic sentiment of the German people, this might have made the
difference.""
Unamendability can also have a transformative function, contrary to its preservative one.
This is the case when unamendability seeks to repudiate the past and guide the nation to a
new path by providing it a fresh constitutional identity for a better future. It "endeavors to
repudiate the past by setting the state on a new course and cementing that new vision into
the character of the state and its people." 26 Unamendability provisions not only reflect a
constitutional commitment to certain enshrined principles but "promise a brighter
future . . . [and] imagine a more perfect polity, the kind that the citizenry aspires to
become and preserve." 2 As the principles which are protected by this prospective
unamendability might be at variance with the historical or prevailing social and cultural
conceptions, system of values, or conditions,128 this unamendability is often merely
aspirational.
Whether unamendability is aspirational or a justiciable legal commitment, and regardless
of the preservative or transformative functions of unamendability, there is one
characteristic shared by these types of unamendability, which is their expressive value. Jon
Elster notes that "the purpose of ... unamendable clauses is . . . mainly symbolic." 25 Even
if not judicially enforceable, or regarded as merely declaratory, unamendability creates the
appearance of respect for the protected principle or institution and "makes a statement"
regarding its importance to the constitutional order. By designating certain principles as
unalterable, unamendability expresses the relative significance of the unamendable
14 See Helmut Goerlich, Concept of Special Protection For Certain Elements and Principles of the Constitution
Against Amendments and Article 79(3), Basic Law of Germany, 1 NUJS L. REv. 397, 397 12003) (discussing how Art.
79(3) of the Basic Law of the Fed. Rep. of Germany prohbits amendments affecting the division of the federation
into states, human dignity, the constitutional order, or basic institutional principles describing Germany as a
democratic and social federal state).
12., Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARV. INT'L L. J. 1, 19 (1995).
12 Albert, supra note 31, at 685.
127 ROZNAI, supra note 31, at 40.
1GARY JErrREY JACOBSOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY 128 (2010).
us Jon Elster, Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 447, 471 (1991).
IM See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021, 2024-25 (1995-1996)
(discussing the function of law in "making statements").
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principles to the constitutional order compared to the other amendable principles. The
unamendability of a principle or an institution sends a message to both internal and
external observers regarding the state's basic constitutional principles thereby conveying
its symbolic value.' 3' As Richard Albert notes, formal unamendability "is the ultimate
expression of importance that can be communicated by the constitutional text.,,132
Therefore, unamendability carries an important symbolic, expressive, and educational
function.
Finally, unamendability can fulfill a certain deliberative task. At first glance it appears that
by blocking mechanisms for modifying certain principles or rules, unamendability takes
away citizens' ability to participate in debates regarding society's basic values, thereby
risking impoverishing democratic debates. However, unamendability can actually force
deliberation, hopefully public, before action is taken to either attempt to circumvent or
ignore the unamendability. In other words, the declaration of unamendability remains
important-even if conceived as eventually amendable or with a limited effect-because
its removal still necessitates political and public deliberations regarding the protected
constitutional values. True, it cannot serve as a complete bar against movements aiming to
abolish unamendable principles, rules, or institutions.133 Nevertheless, it is not completely
unusable because it has a "chilling effect,"leading to hesitation before repealing it and may
trigger political deliberation as to whether the amendment in question is compatible with
society's basic principles.134
131 Elster, supra note 129, at 471; Albert, supra note 31, at 699-702; see Albert, supra note 76 (discussing the
expressive function of amendment provisions).
m Richard Albert, The Unamendabie Core of the United States Constitution, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (Andras Koltay ed., 2016) (forthcoming, on file with author),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2601646.
133 Dietrich Conrad, Limitation of Amendment Procedures and the Constituent Power, 15-16 INDIAN Y.B. INT'L. AFF.
380, 394 (1970).
1A Jason Mazzone, Unomendments, 90 IOwA L. REV. 1747, 1818 (2005).
564 Vol. 16 No. 03
The Eternal Territory?
11. The Formal Unamendability of Territorial Integrity
The concept of territorial indivisibility was originally established as a monarchic principle of
inheritance and succession to avoid division of the country among the monarch's heirs. 1
Interestingly, one of the earliest examples of unamendability of territorial integrity is
related to the transition of Albania from republic to monarchy. The 1928 Fundamental
Statute of the Kingdom of Albania expressly prohibited revisions to the inheritance of the
throne; to the capital; to the characteristics of Albania as a democratic, parliamentary, and
hereditary monarchy; and to its status as an independent and indivisible state. Albania's
territorial integrity was inviolable and its land inalienable.3 6
Current views on territorial integrity find that it is connected to the state's sovereignty and
"right to exist." 37 From a constitutional theory point of view, territory is one of the
elements that make a state and is an important element of state authority. 13  Because
every polity wants to preserve its own existence and identity, it appears prima facie clear
why a state would want to protect its territorial integrity, alongside other core
constitutional and democratic commitments, from possible incursions through
amendments. For "substantive democracies," tolerance finds its limits "when its core
values are at stake." Indeed, "even a tolerant democratic society must be able to police
its fragile borders." 140 States are therefore reluctant to legitimize secessionist claims
because they have a general interest in preserving their own territorial integrity. 14 The will
of self-preservation and the fear of a country's breakdown or disintegration are often
reflected in the constitutional unamendability of territorial integrity or indivisibility.
us Joseph Maro, United in Diversity?: Problems of State-and Nation-Building in Post Conflict Situations. The Case
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 30 VT. L. REV. 503, 505 (2005-2006); Joseph Marko, Ethnopolitics. The Challenge for
Human and Minority Rights Protection, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS: SOME CONTEMPORARY VIEWS
265, 266 (Claudio Corradetti ed., 2012).
136 THE FUNDAMENTAL STATUTE OF THE KINGDOM OF ALBANIA (1928), art. 224(2); see Lavdosh Ahmetaj, The Transition of
Albania from Republic to Monarchy, 10 LUR. SCl. J. 208 (2014),
http://eujournal.org/index.php/esj/article/viewFile/4578/4375 (providing a chronological description of the
transition from republic to monarchy). See generally Makbule Cego, Institute of Constitutional Revision in the
Constitution of the Republic of Albania, Comparative View, 10 ACADEMICuS-INT'L. SCI. J. 126 (2014),
http://oaji.net/articles/2015/1624-1422980065.pdf (describing the constitutional amendment process in
Albania)
137 ABDELHAMID EL OUALI, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND STATES' QUEST FOR
SURVIVAL 5-45 (2012).
1%i NICK W. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 22-24 (2010).
1B9 Angela K. Bourne, The Proscription of Political Parties and Militant Democracy, 7 J. COMP. L. 196, 199 (2012).
Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARY. L. REV. 1405, 1466 (2006-2007).
141 Chase, supra note 12, at 232-33.
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Indeed, many states include within their constitution protection from amendments which
might affect or violate the principle of "integrity and the unity of the national territory" in
one term or another. These are mainly African142 and Eastern European states,4  with
some Latin Americal44 and West European exceptions.14 All of these national constltutions
expressly protect the inviolability of existing territorial borders and reject the possibility of
their change, even through the formal rules prescribing constitutional amendments. 146
Given the centrality of the principle of territorial integrity in international law, it is not
surprising that countries engaged in state-building processes would seek to incorporate it
into their basic laws. Territorial integrity also takes center-stage in bilateral border
agreements between post-communist states and their neighbors. 47 This list shows that
such unamendability commonly appears in constitutions of many states that were former
colonial territories or formerly under foreign rule. In its external perspective which regards
interactions with other sovereigns, the unamendability of territorial integrity serves as a
1 See, e.g., CONSTrrUTION OF ALGERIA February 23, 1989, arts. 178(2); id. Nov. 19, 1976, 195(5); CONsTITUTION OF
ANCOLA Nov. 11, 1975, art. 159(a); id. Jan. 21, 2010, art. 236(b); CONSTITUTION or THE REPUBLIC OF BENIN CONST. Dec. 2,
1990, art. 156; CONSTITUTION OF BURKINA FASO June 14, 1970, art. 106; id. June 2, 1991, art. 165; BURUNDI
CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM March 9, 1992, art. 182; id. Feb 28, 2005, art. 299; CONSTITUTION or THE REPUBLIC OF
CAMEROON June 2, 1972, art. 63; id. Oct. 1, 1961, art. 47; THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAPE VERDE Sept. 4,
1992, art. 313; CONSTITUTION or CHAD Apr. 14, 1996, art. 223; id. Apr. 16, 1962, art. 75; id. Nov. 28, 1960, art. 68;
COMOROS CONSTITUTION Dec. 23, 2001, art. 42; THE REPUBLIC OF CONGO CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM Mar. 15, 1992, art.
178; CONSTITUTION OF COTE DlVOIRE Nov. 3, 1960, art. 73; id. July 24, 2000, art. 127; DJIBOUTI CONST. Sept. 4, 1992,
art. 88; EQUATORIAL GUINEA CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM Nov. 16, 1991, art. 104; id. Aug. 15, 1982, art. 134; id. July
29, 1973, art. 157; CONSTITUTION OF GABON Feb. 21, 1961, art. 70; CONSTITUTION OF GUINEA-BISSAU May 16, 1984, art.
102; MADACASCAR CONSTITUTION Dec. 11, 2010, art. 163; CONSTITUTION or THE REPUBLIC OF MALI Jan 12, 1992, art. 118;
id. June 2, 1974), art. 73; id. Sept. 22, 1960, art. 49; CONSTITUTION OF MAURITANIA July 12, 1991, art. 99(3); id. May
20, 1961, art. 54; CONSTITUTION or NIGER Nov. 8, 1960, art. 73; CONSTITUTION or THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA May 30,
1991, art. 96(2); id. Dec 20, 1978, art. 91; id. Nov. 24, 1962, art. 107; CONSTITUTION OF SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE Nov. 5,
1975, art. 154; CONSTITUTION OF SOMLAIA Aug. 25, 1979, art. 112(3); TOGOLESE CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM Dec. 30,
1979, art. 53; id. May 5, 1963, art. 85.
1 CONSTITUTION OF AZERBAIJAN Nov. 12, 1995, art. 158; KAZAKHSTAN CONSTITUTION Aug. 30, 1995, art. 91(2); MOLDOVA
CONST. July 29, 1994), art. 142; ROMANIA CONST. Nov. 21, 1991, art. 152(1); TAJIKISTAN CONSTITUTION Nov. 30, 1994,
art. 100; TIMOR-LESTE (EASTTIMOR) CONSTITUTION May 20, 2002, art. 156; Entela Hoxhaj & Florian Bjanku, The Basic
Principles as Limits of Constitutional Revision in the Constitutional Jurisprudence and Doctrine in Europe, 1
G.J.A.H.S.S. 47, 49-50 (2013).
4 EL SALVADOR CONSTITUTION Dec. 15, 1983, art. 248; HONDURAS CONSTITUTION Jan. 20, 1982, art. 374.
'4 CONSTITUTION or PORTUGAL Apr, 25, 1976, art. 288; CONSTITUTION or TURKEY Nov. 7, 1982, arts. 3 and 4.
M Albert, supra note 31, at 681.
147 See Budapest Memorandums on Security Assurances, 1994, Council on Foreign Relations (Dec. 5, 1994),
http://www.cfr.org/nonproliferation-arms-control-and-disarmament/budapest-memorandums-security-
assurances-1994/p32484 (discussing how, in Ukraine's case, the Budapest Memorandums on Securty Assurances
included assurances against "the threat or use of force against the territoral ntegrity or political independence of
Ukraine" by either Russia, the United States, or the UK). This deal was struck in order to faciltate Ukraine's
transfer of nuclear weapons on its territory to Russia and its ratifIcation of the Nuclear Nonpro liferation Treaty it
also included assurances to Belarus and Kazakhstan. Id.
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means to claim independence and sovereignty.148 In its internal, in-country perspective,
the unamendability of territorial integrity expresses the state's prioritization of national
integrity over any self-determination claims which may arise. " The principle of territorial
integrity does not necessarily derive from any constitutive principle of the physical
existence of the state. In other words, a state can give up part of its territory thereby
violating its territorial integrity and still continue to exist. 150 Both Egypt and Israel
continued to exist without the Sinai Peninsula just as the United Kingdom would continue
to exist without Scotland; Canada would continue to exist without Quebec, and so on.1s1
The question may thus be not one of physical existence but of identity:
The relationship between a country's territory and its
identity is in many ways similar to the relationship
between an individual['s] identity and his or her body.
Our individual or collective selves are not the same as
the bodies or territories we inhabit, yet there is a clear
and undeniable connection between the two. There
cannot be persons without bodies and no states
without territory.152
1 See cf., Charles H. Norchi, The Legal Architecture of Nation-Building: An Introduction, 60 ME. L. REv. 281, 287
(2008) (discussing how this happens often as a transformative reaction to a prior challenged territorial integrity).
1 m Buralk Cop & Doan Eymirloglu, The Right of Self Determination in International Law Toward the 40th
Anniversary of the Adoption of ICCPR and ICESCR, X PERCEPTIONS-]. INTL AFF. 115, 124 (2005),
http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Bu rakCopAnd Doga nEymi rlioglu. pdf.
Im WEINTAL, supra note 31, ch. 1.
'5' See Paul R. Williams, Abigail J, Avoryle & Carlie J. Armstrong, Earned Sovereignty Revisited: Creating a Strategic
Framework for Managing Self Determination Based Conflicts, 21 ILSAJ. INfL & COMP. L. 1, 2 (2015) (notIng that "In
the last twenty-five years nearly three-dozen new states have emerged. Some new states have arisen from the
dissolution of states, whIle others have seceded from states which then continue to exist .,. ")
lh Erik Ringmar, Russia: Territory and identity Crises (Review Article), 2 NATIONS & NATIONALiSM 453 (1996).
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But as Nick Barber notes, a state can accommodate some change in its territorial
features-as well as in other elements such as its members, institution, and rules-without
losing its identity. It is all a matter of the extent and pace of the change. The question is
therefore: Would the state remain the same without the territory which was separated? If
that answer is no, it might be claimed that if one of the basic rationales behind provisions
of unamendability is to preserve a constitutional identity,15 4 then protecting the territorial
integrity from amendments makes perfect sense. In the next section we analyze what the
Crimean crisis can teach us about using unamendability in order to protect territorial
integrity, and expose our principal objection to this mechanism in the area of territorial
conflicts.
D. Unamendability and Territorial Conflicts: Lessons from Crimea
1. Unamendability of Territorial Integrity and Popular Sovereignty
The unamendability of the state's territorial integrity may be justified by a republican
commitment to achieving the idea of popular self-government. 1s If certain preconditions
such as equality of voting rights must be in place in order for a people to express itself,
then these preconditions must be entrenched. Arguably, given the link between popular
sovereignty and territory, territorial integrity is one such precondition. However, the
Ukrainian experience demonstrates that the unamendability of territorial indivisibility is
not required by popular constitutionalism and in fact might be in clear tension with
popular sovereignty.
1.. BARBER, supra note 138, at 141-42.
154 See Ulrich K. Preuss, The Implications of "Eternity Clauses: The German Experience, 44 Is. L. REV. 429, 445
(2011) ("[Unramendable provislons] define the collective 'self' of the polity-the 'we the people.' If the 'eternal'
normative stipulations were changed, the collective self-or identity-of the polity as embodied in the
constitution would collapse.").
Ih. PHILIP PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE'STERMs: A REPUBLICANTHEORYAND MODELOF DEMOCRACY (2012).
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Ukraine's constitution includes several mechanisms for the expression of popular will.
Article S incorporates a general commitment to republicanism and popular sovereignty,
stating that "[t]he people are the bearers of sovereignty and the only source of power in
Ukraine," while Article 69 lists elections, referendums, and 'other forms of direct
democracy" as means for the expression of popular will. Hence, the people can exercise
their power by the free expression of their will expressly through binding referendums.5 6
Admittedly, Ukraine's experience with direct democracy has not always been
praise-worthy. The 2000 national referendum on increased presidential powers and the
introduction of an upper house of parliament, for instance, was criticized as a power
struggle between president and parliament3 7 and as an exploitation of the referendum for
anti-democratic purposes.'sa What is important for our analysis is that Article 73 of
Ukraine's constitution explicitly links popular sovereignty to the notion of territory.
According to Article 73, "[i]ssues of altering the territory of Ukraine are resolved
exclusively by an all-Ukrainian referendum," while Article 85(2) indicates it is the Ukrainian
Verkhovna Rado which can "designat[e] an all-Ukrainian referendum on issues determined
by Article 73 of this Constitution."' The idea that no territorial change can take place
without consent of "the people" finds its origins in the people's attachment to and
identification with their territory and in the idea of popular sovereignty according to which
the people are the true holders of sovereignty over their territorylC0 Based upon Article
73, it seems clear that a local referendum could not resolve the issue of Crimea and
Ukraine's territorial integrityl
CONSTITUTION OF UKRAINE June 28, 1996, arts. 5, 69; Tykhyi, supro note 96, at 208-09.
Andrds Saj6, Becoming "Europeans". The impact of EU "Constitutionalism" on Post Communist Pre-Modernity,
in SPREADING DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW?: THE IMPACT OF EU ENLARGEMENT ON THE RULE OF LAW, DEMOCRACY AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN POST-COMMUNIST LEGAL ORDERS 180 (Woiclech Sadurski, Adam Czarnota & Martin Krygier eds.,
2006).
so Ronald J. Hil & Stephen White, Referendums in Russia, the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, in
REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD: THE CONTINUED GROWTH OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY 35 (Matt Qvortrup ed., 2014).
159 CONSTITUTION OF UKRAINE June 28, 1996, arts. 73, 85(2). The Law on National Referendum of 2012 lists the
different referendum types and categories those purporting to change the terrItory of Ukraine as "ratification
referendums" (article 3). Article 20 of the law prohibits referendums on territorial changes brought about by
popular initiative and reiterates the ban on modifications of the constitution's rights protections, Ukraine's
independence and its territorial integrity.
1n EL OUALI, supra note 137, at 118. This conceptual relationship between territorial indivisibility and national or
popular sovereignty of course begs the preliminary demarcation of "a people" that Is declared as "sovereIgn."
See, e.g., Sofia Nsstrorm, The Legitimacy of the People, 35 POLITICAL THEORY 624 (2007); see also Tierney, supra
note 17 (discussIng the fraught interaction between self-determination and territorial Integrity).
Bilych et al., supro note 2, at 21. One might argue that this is a case where the factual, manifested In a clear
and unequivocal majority vote in favor of separation, may well attain its own normative value; in Jellinek's terms:
Die normative Kraft des Faktischen. See GEORG JELLINEK, ALLCEMEINE STAATSLEHRE 337-44 (3d ed. 1993); see, cf.,
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From the point of view of constitutional theory, as Stephen Tierney has explored in his
contribution to this volume, the question raised by the Crimean crisis is whether, despite
being illegal, its 2014 referendum can plausibly be seen as legitimate. 162 If we ascribe even
partial legitimacy to the 2014 independence referendum in Crimea, it demonstrates what
Stephen Tierney has previously argued, namely:
[T]he danger of using referendums in deeply divided
societies where they can serve to expose and indeed
inflame what is often a dormant disjuncture between
the boundaries of territorial government and the
nature of the demos/demoi within that territory.
While classifying Ukraine as a "deeply divided society" post-independence may be an
exaggeration,164 the inflammation of its ethno-linguistic divides have exposed the
vulnerability of the country's incomplete internal state- and nation-building processes.
Recent events have illustrated the dangers of assuming the "territorial boundaries of the
demos . . . to be self-evident." Conversely, if Crimea's 2014 independence referendum is
viewed as nothing more than a forceful annexation-"a seizure of territory under threat of
force, i.e. as an unlawful annexation" 1-the territorial boundaries of the state are
revealed as never having been secure in the first place.
Such vulnerabilities are obscured by the categorical language of Ukraine's eternity clause
and expose the contents of the clause as more aspirational than preservative.
EDWARD MCWHINNEY, CONTITUTION-MAKING: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS, PRACTICE 40 (1981). On the "Normative Power of the
Factual," see MARTIN LOUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAw 218 (2010); Tierney, supro note 17.
12Tierney, supra note 17.
m STEPHENTIERNEY, CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUMS: THETHEORYAND PRACTICEOF REPUBLICAN DELIBERATION 75 (2012).
'm See Paul S. Pirie, National identity and Politics in Southern and Eastern Ukraine, 48 FUR.-ASIA STUDS. 1079-104
(1996) (exploring the complexities of identities in Ukraine); see also Sasse, supra note 44, at 70 (discussing how
some have even argued against oversimplifyIng the issue of regional diversity in Ukraine, claiming It served as "a
keyto Ukraine's political stability" during its state-building process).
I TIERNEY,supro note 163, at 59.
IM Peters, supro note 4.
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The main question for our purposes is how this commitment to popular sovereignty
corresponds with the provision of unamendability protecting the territorial integrity. A
commentator on the Ukrainian crisis has suggested that in order to avoid bloodshed,
Ukraine should reform its borders through a referendum: "Let the people decide. If eastern
Ukraine really has an affinity for Russia, then let it become a part of Russia." 7 Because the
Ukrainian constitution defines Crimea as an inseparable constituent part of Ukraine,'68 and
provides that "[t]he territory of Ukraine within its present border is indivisible and
inviolable","" any secession of Crimea necessitates amending the constitution through a
national referendum.170 Such an act would still problematically be prohibited by the
provision of unamendability.' 7 ' Therefore, Ukraine's provision of unamendability, which
protects territorial integrity from violation by reforms and is enforceable by the
Constitutional Court, prevents any secession by referenda. 172
There are two possible solutions to solve this enigma, neither of which is satisfactory. One
solution would be the adoption of a new constitution unbound by provisions of
unamendability through a whole new constituent process.1 Such an action might be
considered a constitutional violation and thus unconstitutional under the current
constitution, but its authoritative legitimacy could be granted ex-post facto. Thus, as
Stephen Tierney has discussed in this volume, "popular" legitimacy would again be relied
upon to overcome a crisis in legality. 17  A second solution, and a legal one, would be
amending the amendment provision itself, through a national referendum as allowed by
the constitution, in order to amend Article 157 and remove the unamendability of the
territorial indivisibility; then, in the second stage, deciding through a national referendum
on the possible division of the territory. This solution would be possible because Article
157, like most provisions of unamendability, is not self-entrenched and could thus be
"amended out" of the constitution through a "double-amendment process." Such an act
would be legal from a formalistic perspective, although its legitimacy would be
questionable as it may be regarded as a "fraud upon the constitution."
167 R. Lauren Johnson, A Plan for Ukraine, VALLEY NEWS (May 9, 2014), http://www.vnews.com/opinion/11891746-
95/letter-a-plan-for-ukraine (last visited June 16, 2015).
CONSTITUTION OF UKRAINEJune 28, 1996, art. 134.
1n Id. art. 2.
170 As required by the Constitution. Id. art. 156.
171 Peters, supro note 4.
1ir Andrew Cybruch, Ukraine's Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity Are Settled, VALLEY NEWS (may 23, 2014),
http://www.vnews.com/home/11999951-95/letter-ukraines-sovereignty-and-territorial-integrity-are-settled (last
visited June 16, 2015).
1r' See ROZNAI, supra note 31. Of course, overcoming unamendability by beginning a whole new constitution-
making process increases the costs as it opens the entire constitution for re-negotiation and accordingly facilitates
strategIc bargaining. See Stephan Michel and Ignaco N. Cofone, Credible Commitment or Paternalism? The Case
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The dilemma can be manifested through the following hypothetical scenario, an unlikely
possibility in Crimea as Ukraine would most likely not agree to secession: We can imagine
that the people of an autonomous region wish to secede, as manifested by a genuine local
referendum. We can further suppose that such secession is debated within the political
bodies which then proceed with a constitutional process for amending the constitution
accordingly. Finally, through a national referendum, which is the appropriate procedure for
deciding alterations to the territory of Ukraine according to Article 73, "the people"
approve such an amendment. The sovereign people, the ultimate holders of constituent
power, would thereby choose to alter the unalterable constitution passed in their name.
This secession, ratified by a constitutionally permissible national referendum, would still
violate Ukraine's unamendable provisions and is thus impermissible, as the people
themselves are bound by the unamendability.1 7 7 By barring constitutional reform which
assails territorial integrity, unamendability attempts to place the state's territory not only
beyond ordinary politics, but also "beyond the popular will."' 7 Hence, it is in clear tension
with popular sovereignty.
of Unomendability, PAPER PRESENTED AT THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY OF PUBLIC LAW WORKSHOP ON UNAMENDABLE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS (Kog University Law School, 9 June 2015) (on file with authors).
174 Cf., Andreas Kalyvas, Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power, 12 CONSTELLATIONS 223, 231
(2005).
' Tierney, supro note 17.
176 Richard Albert, Constructive Unomendability in Conado oand the United Stotes, 67 S.C.L.R. 181, 209-15 (2014);
Yanlv Roznai, Amending 'Unamendable' Provisions, CONSTITUTION-MAKINC & CONSTITUTIONAL CHANCE BLOC (Oct. 20,
2014), http://constitutional-change.com/amending-unamendable-provisions/ (last visited June 16, 2015).
177 See generally THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL FORM (Martin Loughlin &
Nell Walker eds., 2007) (discussing the paradoxes of the constitutional order and constituent power); The Parodox
of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form, 6 INT'L]. CONST. L. 358 (Martin Loughlin & Neil
Walker eds., 2008), http://icon.oxfordjournals.org/content/6/2/358,full.pdf (reviewed by Zoran Oklopcic).
I 4 John McGarry, Brendan O'Leary & Richard Simeon, Integrotion or Accommodotion? The Enduring Dehate in
Conflict Regulation, in CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR DIVIDED SOCIETIES: INTEGRATION OR ACCOMMODATION? 41, 48 (Sujft
Chaudhry ed., 2008).
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Often, that is precisely the role of unamendability. Unamendability, as a counter-
majoritarian institution, aims to neutralize the dangers of majoritarianism "9 It reflects the
idea that certain principles, such as fundamental rights, rule of law, and the democratic
principle itself are not subject to the will of the majority, which might abuse them.'8 By
that, unamendability serves not only to prevent abuse by leaders, but to serve as a
pre-commitment mechanism of "the people" to protect itself against its own weaknesses
and passions.182 These rationales do not apply to territorial integrity-at least not to a
same extent. Thus, the people should be allowed to make this constitutional change
dealing with the territory. As long as concern for minority rights is taken into consideration
when dealing with negotiations in a context of secession, as Canada's Supreme Court
emphasized in its Secession Reference case,I" allowing the people to amend their
constitution after political deliberation and approval through a national referendum would
still maintain a high bar for that constitutional change while simultaneously satisfying the
ideals of republican constitutionalism.
17 Albert, supro note 31, at 675.
1' See, e.g., Gunnar Beck, The idea of Human Rights Between Value Pluralism and Conceptual Vagueness, 25 PENN
ST. INT'L L. REv. 615 (2006-2007); ARNOLD BRECHT, FEDERALISM AND REGIONALISM IN GERMANY: THE DIVISION OF PRUSSIA 138
(1945),
1 Charles M. Fambad, Limits on the Power to Amend Constitutions: Recent Trends in Africa and Their Potential
Impacton Constitutionalism, 6 UNIv. BOTs. L. J. 27, 57 (2007).
m2STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THETHEORYOr LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 135 (1995).
1 See Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, paras. 48-54, 79-82, 90, 93 (Can.); see also
Oklopcic, supro note 15; Tierney, supra note 17. But see DAVID HAJAN, CONSTITUTIONALISING SECESSION 325 (2014)
(questioning how the Supreme Court's reference to minority protection functions alongside the other three
principles it put forth for negotiating secession).
I LKER GOKHAN 5EN, SOVEREIGNTY RErERENDUMS IN INTERNATIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 142 (2015) ("[Rleferendums
may fulfill an effective veto function whenever there is a threat to territorial integrity. Thus, a constitutional
requirement for the consent of the majority as a condition for a territorial modification may be portrayed as a
wise safeguard in the face of political realities.").
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11. The Limited Effectiveness and Risks of Unamendability of Territorial Integrity
A major lesson from the crisis in Crimea is the limited effectiveness of attempts to settle
territorial conflicts through unamendability. The unamendability of the territorial integrity
principle within the Ukrainian constitution may be regarded as a mechanism aimed at
preserving this principle by adding another layer of constitutional illegality to cover
situations such as Crimea's. It was meant to be preservative rather than merely
declarative, and its intended function is evident from judicial enforcement of
unamendability by the Constitutional Court. Nonetheless, while the unamendability
provision provided a legal peg on which to hang arguments against territorial change,
neither Crimea nor Russia seemed particularly deterred in their course of action by threats
of either constitutional or international illegality.8 5 Furthermore, as noted earlier,
Ukraine's constitution already contained mechanisms that were arguably stronger
encouraging national deliberation in the eventuality of redrawing the territorial map, not
the least of which were national referendums. The recourse to unamendability was meant
as an added safeguard but turned out to be no match for forces from both within and
without.
The unamendability of the territorial integrity, which must be read in the context of the
country's complicated state- and nation-building post-independence process,1 86 also
carried an aspirational aspect. Kiev used unamendability to deal with a complex territorial
challenge and to entrench its long-term hold on Crimea. The provision of unamendability
expressed an aspiration for the resolution of this challenge-the full integration of Crimea
within the Ukrainian state-more than an uncontested reality. As this article discussed
previously, the problem with aspirational unamendability is that its characteristics might
be at odds with the prevailing culture or circumstances of the society. 87 Territorial
indivisibility was incorporated as aspirational in the national constitution, but many of the
region's citizens may never have wanted to be part of Ukraine at all. The unamendability,
which started out as a constitutional provision with preservative and aspirational
functions, could end up being aspirational and nothing more.
1 Of course, from this lack of deterrence one should not infer conclusions regarding the legality of the act. See
Christakis, supra note 81
[N]o self respecting legal order can remain indifferent to the events
that have marked Russia's annexation of Crimea. Failure to react
would send the message that 'might makes right' and would harm
international relations because powerful states might henceforth be
tempted to use force against their neighbors to provoke 'blitz
secessions' and annex ethnic, Lnguistic, or religious 'sister' minorities
who dream of becoming part ofthe 'motrherland.'
SASSE, supro note 44, at 16.
see ]ACOBSOHN,supra note 128, at 128.
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True, all constitutional provisions of unamendability cannot have an absolute effect. In
1918, A. Lawrence Lowell wrote that "the device of providing that a law shall never be
repealed is an old one, but I am not aware that it has ever been of any avail.""s Similarly,
Benjamin Akzin expressed his skepticism regarding the usefulness of eternity clauses since,
if "the demand for change were to become so strong ... it is hardly imaginable that its
protagonists would renounce their objectives only because the Constitution says that the
provision is inviolable." 9 From a purely factual point, that is certainly correct. "In a
conflict between law and power," Hannah Arendt wrote, "it is seldom the law which will
emerge as victory."190 No constitutional schemes, even those that expressly attempt to do
so, can hinder for long the sway of real or brute forces in public life."' Constitutional
unamendability is therefore a question of both norm and fact.1 ,2 The ability of physical
power to force prohibited changes-for example, a forcible annexation of territory, which
would violate the territorial integrity or a forcible revolution to overcome
unamendability-is unquestionable. From a legal perspective, the question remains
whether forced territorial or constitutional changes would be valid according to the
constitutional system's standards.'93
in A. LAWRENCE LOWELL, GREATER EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS 103 (1918).
]M Benjamn Akzin, The Place of the Constitution in the Modern State, 2 ISR. L. REV. 1, 12 (1967).
19 HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 142 (2006).
141Benjamin Akzin, On the Stability and Reality of Constitutions, 3 SCRIPTA HIEROSOLYMITANA 313, 332 (1956).
192 V'ctor M. Musiz-Fraticelli, The Problem of a Perpetual Constitution, in INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE 379, 379-80 (A
Gosseries and L. Meyer eds., 2009).
193 Walter F. Murpny, Staggering Toward the New Jerusalem of Constitutional Theory: A Response to Ralph F.
Goebler, 37 AM. J. JURIs. 337, 348 (1992).
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Whereas these statements are correct with regard to all provisions of unamendability, they
are all the more relevant to the unamendable protection of territorial indivisibility. The
constitutional protection of territorial integrity is Janus-faced, looking both externally and
internally. Externally, it looks to the relationship between states and to the protection of
territorial integrity against external threats and use of force such as armed attacks,
annexation, and occupation. Internally, it aims to protect the territory against internal
threats, mainly by limiting people's claims to what is termed 'external self-determination'
by territorial secession. 9 4  There is thus a conceptual difference between the
unamendability of territorial integrity versus unamendability of other principles such as
fundamental rights, secularism, separation of powers, and the form of government. The
latter principles are all under domestic control, regulated by various governmental and
institutional bodies, which allow-especially when accompanied by effective mechanisms
of judicial review-for the enforcement of provisions of unamendability. For example, the
Turkish Constitutional Court was able to protect the unamendable principle of secularism
from infringements by governmental attempts to amend the constitution in order to
abolish a headscarf ban in universities;' 93 the Czech Constitutional Court managed to
protect the unamendable principle of the rule of law by invalidating an ad hoc
constitutional act which called early elections by bypassing the established constitutional
procedure. 9  These were instances where unamendable basic constitutional principles
were challenged by domestic institutions. Territorial integrity is distinct because it faces a
dual threat, internal and external, which is independent of state authority, hence making it
more vulnerable than other unamendable principles. If the state fears the voluntary ceding
of territory under external pressure or coercion, what could be the utility of an
unamendability clause on territorial integrity?
' See generally Milena Sterio, On The Right to External Self-Determination: "Selfistans," Secession, and the Great
Powers' Rule, 19 MINN. J. INT'L L. 137 (2010); Jure Vidrnar, The Annexation of Crimea and the Boundaries of the Will
of the People, 16 GERMAN LJ. 365 (2015); Amandine Catala, Secession and Annexation: The Case of Crimea, 16
GERMAN L. 581 (2015); EL OUALI, supra note 137, at 113-66, 241-94.
195 See Yanlv Roznal & Serkan Yolcu, An Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment-The Turkish Perspective: A
Comment on the Turkish Constitutional Court's Headscarf Decision, 10 INT'L]. CONST. L. 175 (2012); Ergun Ozbudun,
Judicial Review of ConstitutionalAmendments in Turkey, 15 EUR. PUB. L. 533 (2009).
1% See Yanv Rozal, Legisprudence Limitations on Constitutional Amendments? Reflections on the Czech
Constitutional Court's Declaration of Unconstitutional Constitutional Act, 8 VIENNA J. INTL CONST. L. 29 (2014);
Kieran Willians, When a Constitutional Amendment Violates the Substantive Core: The Czech Constitutional
Court's September2009 Early Elections Decision, 36 REV. CEN. & EAST EUR. L. 33 (2011); Jan Kudrna, Concellation of
Early Elections by the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic: Beginning of A New Concept of "Protection of
Constitutionality," 4 JURISPRUDENCLA/URISPRUDENCE 43 (2010).
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First, it may attach the stigma of domestic illegality to the breakaway unit or its annexing
state, but that is not a very strong disincentive. Especially, when combined with potentially
plausible legitimacy claims,1  this deterrent becomes even less effective. Additionally,
from an international law point of view, 'such constitutional provisions have no legal effect
on the international order." 9
Second, the unamendability of territorial integrity might be regarded as a welcome
mechanism for protecting democratic decision-making against "blackmail" by minorities. It
allegedly shuts down the option for secession and, at the very least, enhances the
bargaining position of those against separatism, if unamendability is not interpreted as
providing a duty to uphold the territorial integrity. 13 As Cass Sunstein suggested,
constitutions should not include a right to secede since protecting such a right equips
minority groups with a strategic and even dangerous weapon and power of bargaining. 20o
Even if one accepts Sunstein's claim, there is an important difference between not
including a right to secede within a constitution or even explicitly forbidding such a right,
and absolutely entrenching territorial indivisibility as unamendable. As ilker Gbkhan $en
writes:
With the exception of [.. ] rare cases, unilateral
secession is forbidden by the quasi-totality of the
World Constitutions. This does not exclude, however,
the constitutional regulation of the territorial
modification of a state. It is not illogical to assume that
the constituent power anticipate a future threat to the
territorial integrity and prefer to frame a procedure to
regulate against such an occurrence. Consequently,
numerous constitutions include the referendum device
as a condition for secession or other form of territorial
alteration that may prove inevitable and irreversible.20 '
197 See also Tierney, supro note 17.
Christakis, supw note 8.
1E See, supro note 81.
200 See Cass Sunstein, ConstitutionalisM and Secession, 58 UNI. CHI. L REv. 633, 634 (1991)
To Place such a rIght In a founding document would increase the risks
of ethnic and factional struggle; reduce the prospects for
compromise and deliberations in government; raise dramatically the
stakes of day-today political decisions; introduce Irrelevant and
illegitimate considerations into those decisions; create dangers of
blackmall, strategic behavior; and exploitation; and, most generally,
endanger the prospects for long-term self-government.
21EN, supr note 184, at 142.
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The risk is that, in terms of constitutional dynamics, unamendability might serve the exact
opposite of its original preservative purpose: Not only does it not prevent the changes, but
by blocking any chance of achieving them through peaceful and political means, it
encourages the realization of these changes in an extra-constitutional manner. 2 One
study demonstrates that the lack of a strategic framework that produces peaceful
resolutions to self-determination-based conflicts "grants independence to entities that
fight their way to independence, which perpetuates violence and instability."203 According
to this perspective, unamendability of territorial integrity is not only ineffective but might
also frustrate attempts at peace-making.0
It is true that unamendability in general may be more effective in ordinary peaceful times
than in times of crisis and in states where political players understand that they have to
play according to the democratic rules of the game. To that end, unamendability can be
described by the metaphor of a lock on a door." 25 A lock cannot prevent housebreaking by
a determined burglar equipped with good burglary tools, and even more to the point, it
cannot prevent its own-or the entire door's-destruction by sledgehammer or fire. At the
same time, there is no need for the safety measure of a lock if we are dealing solely with
honest people, because then there is no fear that any of them will attempt to break into
the house. The lock's utility is in deterring those who usually obey the accepted rules when
those rules are accompanied by effective safety-measures. When such measures are
missing and they are facing an easy opportunity to improve their condition at the expense
of others, burglars may succumb to the temptation to exploit this opportunity. Finally, the
lock also has a psychological function: It is a mechanism we use in order to reassure
ourselves that we are safe and protected.
202 See, e.g., Andrew Fried man, Dead Hand Constitutionalism: The Danger of Eternity Clauses in New Democracies,
4 MEXICAN L REV. 77, 93-96 (2011).
203 WillIams, Avoryie & Armstrong, supro note 151, at 21 (contending that territorial conflicts are more Ikely to
recur than other types of conflicts). See Suzanne Werner, The Precarious Nature of Peace: Resolving the issues,
Enforcing the Settlement, and Renegotiating the Terms, 43 AM. ]. POL. SCl. 912, 915, 924 (1999).
2 Cf. Christakis, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. ("[F]or Crimea, as probably for other very difficult
cases that sour International relations ... only a solution that Is negotiated and freely accepted by all the
protagonIsts wIll probably bring about a solutIon to this fierce conflIct between unlawful effectivites and the
law.").
1"- See RozNAI, supro note 31, at 217.
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In the same way, unamendability cannot block extra-constitutional measures. It is also not
needed when the socio-political culture is that of self-restraint and lawfulness because, in
that situation, there is no fear of an attempt to change the political system's fundamental
structures or to abuse power. Unamendability is aimed at preventing the same temptation
the burglar faces. Finally, in its aspirational aspect, unamendability makes us feel good
about ourselves. Karl Loewenstein was not mistaken in his observation that in ordinary
peaceful times, unamendability can function as a useful red light before political actors
attempt to change the constitution. In contrast, during times of crisis, unamendability is
just a piece of paper which political reality could disregard or ignore.20'
E. Conclusion
Before concluding, a few disclaimers are warranted. In this paper, we are arguing neither
against nor in favor of the general use of unamendability."3  We also acknowledge the
importance of territorial integrity and do not argue in favor of or against the right to
secede.3 8 We do claim that if constitutional designers wish to use the mechanisms of
unamendability, they should reserve it for protecting the most basic principles of the
democratic order, which can be enforced and not ignored at will. Unamendability is a
'complex and potentially controversial constitutional instrument, which should be applied
with care," 9 especially when it is used in order to protect the state's territorial integrity.
2" Karl Loewenstein, Constitutions, Constitutioaol Low, in MARXISM, COMMUNISM, AND WESTERN SOciETY: A
COMPARATIVE Encyclopedia 169, 180-81 (C.D. Kernig ed., 1972).
207 In fact, one of us has argued that unamendablty rests upon a solid theoretical ground. See ROZNAI, supro note
31; Yaniv Roznai, Towards a Theory of Unomendability (NYLI School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 15-1,
2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2569292. The other has investigated the democratic legitimacy of eternity
clauses and found it to vary considerably according to the substance and method of adoption and repeal of such
clauses. See SILVIA SUTEu, ETERNITY AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF ETERNITY CLAUSES (PhD Thesis,
forthcoming 2015).
Such recognition carries Its own risks. See Christalis, supra note 81 (arguing that "accepting to extend a rIght of
secession to the post-colonial context would open up Pandora's box by allowing the world's 6000 ethnic groups
to cl am a right of secession").
If) Venice Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Report on Constitutional Amendment,
COUNCIL OF EUR. 43 (Jan. 19, 2010), http://www.venice.coe.int/webfarms/docurments/CDL-AD(2010)001.aspx (last
visited June 16, 2015).
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Unamendability of territorial integrity is more vulnerable than other principles protected
via constitutional eternity clauses. It is subject to the internal threat of secessionist
movements and the external threat of forceful annexation, both of which are plausible
frames within which to cast the 2014 Crimean crisis. As the latter situation has shown,
territorial unamendability is an especially ineffective example of the preservative function
of the eternity clause. In fact, unamendability played no direct role in the current crisis,
which raises imperative questions regarding the ability or inability of constitutional law to
effectively address and regulate issues relating to the indivisibility of a state's territory.
Crimea is also a case that exposes the limits of constitutional law and theory in the face of
claims of popular sovereignty legitimized, however problematically, via referendums.
Given "the deep pathology of uncertainty" in both constitutional and international law in
this area and the various "overlapping and conflicting" legal doctrines,
constitutionalizing territorial integrity as unamendable does little to clear the waters.
Additionally, the Ukrainian crisis exposes the vicious cycle at work behind unamendability.
We ascribe certain principles as unamendable because we know that these are the most
fragile. Samuel Issacharoff is right in claiming that the provisions which "are off the table
for internal change generally reflect[] the birth pangs of that particular society."'
Constitution-drafters design provisions so as to work exactly against the features of a
state's tradition and culture which could cause damage through the ordinary political
process.21 2 We assign unamendability to those principles which are considered at risk, but
unamendability itself cannot provide complete-or, in the case of territorial integrity,
perhaps any effective-protection. Ignoring certain unamendable fundamental principles
might lead to disrespect of other imperative unamendable principles. Weakening
unamendable fundamental constitutional principles widens the gap between
constitutional norms and constitutional reality, thereby challenging constitutional
supremacy, undermining respect for the constitutional ordering itself, and destabilizing the
entire constitution. When territorial integrity is under threat, and the entire constitutional
order is jeopardized, our inadequate unamendable "lock on the door" will likely prove of
poor make indeed.
21 Tierney, supro note 17.
" Issacharoff, supw note 140, at 1430. In this respect, Kim Lane Scheppele is correct in claimIng that
constitutions are not only future looking, but also reacting to past events. See Kim Lane Scheppele, A Constitution
Between Post and Future, 49 WM. & MARY L REV. 1377 (2008).
m Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutioalism, Prosperity, Democracy, 2 CONSr. POL. ECON. 371, 385 (1991).
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